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ABSTRACT 
After becoming a candidate member of Turkey to European Union at the end of 2005, 
European Union demanded to continue implement political reforms from Turkey such as 
religious freedom and minority rights. However, these reforms demands in Turkey were not 
welcomed by the all political actors and citizens. While European Union declared that Turkey 
needs further efforts to implement the religious freedom and minority rights reforms; with 
the negative memories about both ethnic and religious minorities from the history, Turkish 
side were assessed the religious freedom and minority rights demands of European Union as 
a threat to country and Turkish side avoided to implement these reforms.  
 
Key Words: European Union, Turkey, minority rights reform, religious freedom reform
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Republic of Turkey always turned its face to the western world1 since its foundation in 
comparison to the Ottoman Empire. In this direction, Turkey always had close relationship 
with western countries and process of European Union (EU) membership has continued 
more than 30 years.  There has been up and downs during this process but Turkey became 
officially a candidate member to EU in 2005. EU has demanded to continue the political 
reform implementations from Turkey who is sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Within this context, EU expected from Turkey to implement religious freedom and minority 
rights, cultural rights and protection of minorities (thereafter “minority rights” as 
abbreviation) reforms and they pointed out the necessity of reform implementations 
regarding these topics in Turkey Progress reports. As a matter of fact, Turkey responded 
these reform expectations according to their own internal dynamics. The expectations of EU 
about these two topics have been interpreted and evaluated differently by political actors 
and citizens. While citizens and political parties such as Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peace and Justice Party (AKP) reluctant to 
implementation of minority rights and religious freedom reforms, Peace and Democracy 
Party (BDP) supported the implementation of these reforms and reactions of citizens and 
political parties were highly affected by the history.  
As a matter of fact, non-Muslim groups are described as minorities since Ottoman Empire 
and only Jewish, Armenian and Greek people are seen as minorities according to Lausanne 
Peace Treaty. Therefore, religious freedom and minority rights reform demands of EU have 
been evaluated within this context in Turkey.  
The Ottoman Empire in the period of loss of power had to accept the reform demands made 
by Western powers by using minorities. The reforms have been implemented by the Rescript 
of Gülhane and Edict of Reform accordingly however these reforms have been reacted 
negatively by both public and political elites. Comments on implemented reforms’ being 
mainly concessions have been made. Reactions of EU relating religious freedoms and 
                                                             
1 This term is used by many scholars to explain the political, social, economical and cultural relationships among 
Turkey and Western European countries and Turkey’s interest to become part of the Western World. i.e. Ali A. 
Mazrui, Müslüman Toplumlarda Demokratikleşme: Tahrir Meydanı ve Türkiye (Bilim ve Sanat Foundation, 
Journal 75, 2011)  
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minorities are commented in this respect in the light of these facts and are perceived as a 
threat to Turkey. Indeed the only goal of EU is to ensure that the rights of citizens who are 
not Turkish and live in the country should be protected and they should live in better 
conditions. However, the Turkish public and most of the political parties regard the EU bills 
for reformation as an endeavor to divide the country and oppose them. With the effect of 
the trails from the past, minorities have been treated like second class citizens at the level of 
both the state and the public in Turkey anyway and minorities are defined as a “rascally” in 
Turkey and they faced terrible discriminations. Therefore, religious freedom and minority 
rights reforms were not welcomed in Turkey by all of the political actors and citizens, and 
only little progress were made since 2005. Only Peace and Democracy Party supported these 
reform implementations in Turkey. On the other hand, European Union side found that 
reform reactions of Turkey are not sufficient and further steps need to be taken in future.  
Within this context, I will introduce the methodology and theoretical framework and I will 
talk about the short historical background of EU and process of Turkey to become a member 
of EU in the first part of the paper. In the second part, I will write about the EU reactions 
regarding EU Turkey Progress reports and interview I made with an official member of 
European Commission. In addition, I will talk about how these two reform expectations were 
reacted by citizens and Turkish political actors. I will also give brief historical backgrounds of 
political parties. 
 In the final part, I will give brief information regarding how Turkish political actors and 
public should behave about these reform expectations. Accordingly, I will try to find possible 
answers to these questions in this paper: 
- How EU sides react to the implementation process of minority rights and religious 
freedom reforms? 
-  How Turkish political parties (Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), Nationalist 
Movement Party (MHP), Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peace and Justice Party 
(AKP) and public reacted to the minority rights and religious freedom reforms called 
by European Union? 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
I used qualitative method to write my thesis. In addition, I used best suitable designs to gain 
a good result for my thesis. Due to Integration process of Turkey’s being a case example, the 
best research design for my research was to use “Case Study Design”. The basic element of 
case study designs involves the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case.2  
First of all, I used “secondary analysis of data” involves the analysis of data that others have 
collected related to my research question such as semi-structured or structured interviews, 
focus groups transcripts, observation records, and other personal, research-related 
documents.3 I thought I need a collection of data to be better acknowledged about my 
research topic. Using secondary data analysis definitely provided me more time on the 
analysis and explanation of data. Lack of time and resource are also other relevant reasons 
to use secondary data to collect data. 
In addition to that, I used “documents as sources of data” which include personal documents 
(diaries, letters, and autobiographies), official documents derived from state (Republic of 
Turkey) or private sources (EU) and the mass media.4 I contacted to Secretariat General for 
EU Affairs (Turkey) to ask for related data to my research topic such as interviews, official 
documents. I did the same by contacting to EU as well. 
To reflect the EU reactions, EU Turkey Progress Reports from 2006 to 2010 were dealt. In 
addition, interviews were done before with EU officials such as EU Parliament Rapporteur 
Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Helene Flautre and Cas-Granje were mentioned. Discourses of some 
groups in the EU such as European Parliament Christian Democrat Group and European 
Parliament Socialist Group were also touched upon in the thesis.   
In order to be able to analyze the discourses of AKP on EU reforms, the discourses of the 
party leader and the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, of Ali Babacan, who was the chief 
negotiator until 2009, and of Egemen Bağış, of Abdullah Gül, who was the foreign affairs 
                                                             
2 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd Edition, Oxford University) 52 
3 Ibid. 296 
4 Ibid. 515-535 
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minister from 2005 until today, and of Ahmet Davutoğlu and of the other party members, of 
the party program and 2007 and 2011 election affidavits of the party have been examined.  
Moreover, I used official documents of Secretariat General for EU Affairs (Turkey) related to 
my thesis topic. And to comprehend the reactions of CHP to EU reforms, the speeches of 
Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu – period leaders – and the discourses of party members, 
the party program and 2007 and 2011 election affidavits have been taken into account. 
Moreover, in order to measure the reactions of MHP to EU reforms, the discourses of Devlet 
Bahçeli and party members, of the party program and 2007 and 2011 election affidavits, and 
Turkey and Politics magazine, which is published by Research and Development Centre 
belonging to the party and which is published every two months, and the reports prepared 
by R&D Centre have been examined. The attitudes of BDP, consisting of the gathered 
independent candidates because the threshold is 10%, on EU reforms have been analyzed 
through discourses of party members, 2011 election affidavit, party programs and 
regulations.  
Due to not being done any scientific study to reflect the reactions of citizens about EU 
reforms, I used the media resources and mostly focused on actions of citizens against both 
ethnic and religious minorities such as attacks, murders and discriminations and researches 
of research institutions which reflected the reactions of citizens about minorities in Turkey. 
 I also arranged some semi-structured interviews. I did not use any specific questions during 
the interviews. I just mentioned about my master thesis topic and interviewee talked 
generally about my topic. According to the conversation, some critical questions were asked 
to interviewees regarding thesis topic. I had three interviews with an officer of an EU; 
representatives from Alevis and Protestants. EU and Protestant representative did not want 
to be used of their job title, institutions and names in the thesis. Therefore, I mentioned all 
of them as “representative”. Alevi Representative of Hacı Bektaş Veli Institutions 
Headquarters did not have any problem putting his/her name but I did not put it due to not 
having possible problems in the future. I used face to face interview method with EU and 
Alevi representative. I visited office of EU representative in Brussels and the interview was 
recorded with a voice recorder in a silent room. I also visited Ankara to do my interview with 
Alevi representative and the interview was also recorded with a voice recorder in a silent 
room. I used phone interview with representative of Protestants due to having limited time 
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and money to visit another city called Izmir. I also recorded this interview with a voice 
recorder. In addition, I wanted to have more interviews with officials of political parties but I 
was rejected due to general election period and lack of interests of political parties.  
The reason I chose semi structured interview, because when it is about politics most of the 
time people do not give direct answers to the questions. They prefer giving indirect answers 
and the structure should maximize the reliability and validity of measurement of key 
concepts.5 Besides, if I used structured interview, it would be impossible to get the answers 
that I sought.  The aim of interview in structured one is to reflect the researcher’s concern 
which is not suitable for my topic. I wanted to see the reflections and answers of 
interviewee.  In addition, in qualitative interviewing, discursive or going off at tangents is 
mostly encouraged to understand what the interviewee sees as relevant and important.6 So, 
interviewee can give answers related to my research topic even if I do not intend to ask such 
questions. 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. WESTERNIZATION AND MODERNISM  
Turks always turned their faces to the western world and moved accordingly. Even they 
turned their face to Asia; they always aimed to be part of the western world. Thus, Turks 
turned their faces to Western countries after the defeat of Vienna and to avoid from the 
standstill and devolution period. 
Consciously or not and sometimes forced or voluntarily, Turks’ way moved towards the 
western world. After the foundation of republic, the founder of Turkey Atatürk prioritized 
the modernism and westernization for the sake of country. Nonetheless, Atatürk’s politics 
were completely different than Ottoman’s. B. Oran separate the Atatürk’s westernization 
idea from Ottoman’s with like this: “Copying Western world in Atatürk’s time was not 
eclectic and scrappy in compared to Ottoman’s, it was systematic and monolith. In other 
words, West was tried to copy as a whole and system rather than copying it by saying some 
parts are good or not... Secondly, Atatürk assessed the western world as a purpose not a 
                                                             
5 Ibid. 437 
6 Ibid. 437 
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tool... Western concept is identical to modernism according to Atatürk. Atatürk said the 
there is no such thing to resist against Western world, there is such thing to be like Western 
world.”7 Since Atatürk, this approach remained same until today. When it comes to 
definition and concept of modernism; the purpose to be reached as a nation has been 
“contemporary civilization level”.8  Within this context, political, social and cultural life of 
Ottoman had to be changed with the other civilization which was western world’s political, 
social and cultural life.9 It was not a clavish westernization of Atatürk’s westernization idea 
and he always pointed out the westernization despite of Western.10 As İ. Öztoprak’s stated, 
it will be better to use the modernism rather than westernization. Because, Atatürk’s 
modernism was not a replica, it was reaching to the level of contemporary civilization by 
harmonizing with the Turkey’s own values and institutions.11 As a result, base of external 
politics of Turkey lied under the westernization and modernism. In addition, as a result of 
the rising of globalization, Turkey adopted itself to the European Integration process and 
shaped its external politics according to it.  
3.2. GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
There has been several definitions and starting period of globalization. Like Jan Aart 
Scholte’s said “Each understanding of a key concept reflects a historical moment, a cultural 
setting, a geographical location, a social status, an individual personality and – as already 
noted – a political commitment.”12 For some authors, globalization has started with 
privatization and liberalization politics introduced by the Reagan administration in USA and 
Thatcher in Great Britain during the 80s in the 20th century; some others like Thomas 
Friedman thinks that globalization started in 15th century and continue up to our days.13  
According to Philip G. Cerny, “Globalization is defined here as a set of economic and political 
                                                             
7 Baskın Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği (Dost Kitabevi Publisher 1988) 211-212 
8 İzzet Öztoprak, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Dış Dünyadaki Etkileri (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, Sayı 1, 
Cilt:I, November 1984) 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ekrem Aksoy, Batılılaşma ve Atatürk (Hacettepe Universitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Cumhuriyetimizin 
75. Yılı Özel Sayısı) 84 
11 İzzet Öztoprak, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Dış Dünyadaki Etkileri (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, Sayı 1, 
Cilt:I, November 1984) 
12 Jan Aart Scholte, What is Globalization? The Definitional Issues – Again (Department of Politics and 
International Studies, University of Warwick CSGR Working Paper 109/02 , December 2002) 6 
13 Diana Bobica, European Integration and Globalization (European Integration – Realities and Perspectives, 
European Studies Institute, Iaşi, 2010) 211 
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structures and processes deriving from the changing character of the goods and assets that 
comprise the base of the international political economy—in particular, the increasing 
structural differentiation of those goods and assets.”14  
Nonetheless, European countries tried to adopt their external policies according to rising 
trend of globalization.15 Globalization was the new system for USA in shaping their external 
policies and European countries took some measures not to fall behind of USA. 
Consequently, they decided to establish a community to keep the peace in Europe through 
steel and coal. B. Rosamond defines this reflection as “…tendency of groups of territorially 
adjacent states to cluster together into blocks.”16 
Therefore, first steps of the EU started with the signing the ECSC Treaty in 1951 by France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. Further integration processes until 
today brought us to an establishment of a community called as European Union which today 
has 27 members.   
Even though there is no direct effect, the integration policy of European Union was an 
economical and a political step towards USA’s globalization process.17 As Diana Bobica 
stated, “The retrospective look on the formation of the European Union allows us to come 
up with an answer regarding the role played by the European integration in the general 
context of globalization.”18 
Needless to argue, globalization triggered the European Integration process and results of 
the integration process contributed to the globalization. Arguably we can say that both 
globalization and European integration has close relationship and they affect each other 
negatively or positively in terms of political, social, economical or security.19  
During all these globalization and EU integration processes, as a new founded Republic, 
Turkey decided to take part in these globalization and European Integration processes while 
it aimed at westernization and modernism for itself. Within this context, Turkey became a 
                                                             
14 Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the changing logic of collective action (International Organization 49, 4, 
Autumn 1995 pp. 595-625) 596 
15 George Ross, European Integration and Globalization Ch. 10 (Globalization and Europe: theoretical and 
empirical investigation by Roland Axtmann, 1998) 164 
16 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (Macmillan Press, 1. Edition, 2000 London) 15 
17 George Ross, European Integration and Globalization Ch. 10 (Globalization and Europe: theoretical and 
empirical investigation by Roland Axtmann, 1998) 164-5 
18 Diana Bobica, European Integration and Globalization (European Integration – Realities and Perspectives, 
European Studies Institute, Iaşi, 2010) 213 
19 George Ross, European Integration and Globalization Ch. 10 (Globalization and Europe: theoretical and 
empirical investigation by Roland Axtmann, 1998) 165 
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member of international organizations such as NATO, OECD.  In addition, Turkey applied to 
become a member of EEC in 1959 to actively involved in globalization and EU integration 
processes.  
4. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EUROPEAN UNION 
The idea of European Union was just a dream in the thoughts of thinkers/philosophers and 
visionaries before it became a real political goal. For instance, Victor Hugo, inspired by 
humanistic ideals, dreamt of a ‘United States of Europe’ in peace.20 However this dream was 
destroyed by terrible wars which devoured the continent in the first half of 20th century.  
Besides, there were many attempts, Pan-European movements in particular21, in order to 
form a union after the World War II and the organizations such as Organization for European 
Cooperation (OECC) or European Council failed.22 Afterwards, Robert Schuman, Foreign 
Minister of France, offered to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 9 
May 1950 by using the idea which was originally suggested by Jean Monnet as a base.  The 
production of coal and steel in the countries which once fought against each other would be 
collected under the supervision of a common ‘Authority’. Raw materials of the war would 
turn into the tools of peace and reconciliation practically but mostly symbolically. This offer 
was put into effect by the Paris Treaty in 18 April 1951. By this way, a coal and steel market 
was formed between the six founding countries (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Italy, Luxemburg and Holland). The aim was to establish peace between the nations 
of Europe which gained a victory and which disappeared and to gather these countries by 
cooperation in the shared institutions equally. Despite the inadequateness of ECSC in terms 
of institutional and federalist aspects, the achievement of it made a way for the Rome 
Treaty.23 Afterwards, in 25 March 1957 the six founding countries established the European 
Economic Community (EEC) which is a broader based common market comprising every kind 
of product and service and the customs transactions was removed in 1 July 1968 between 
these six countries and instead, common politics was formed in 60s especially in trade and 
                                                             
20 Pascal Fontaine, AB Nedir? (European Commission)  5 
21 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd 
Edition, 2005) 41 
22 Walter Hallstein, United Europe: challange and opportunity (Harvard University Press, 1962) 7-9 
23 Şaban H. Çalış, Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri Kimlik Arayışı, Politik Aktörler ve Değişim (Nobel Yayın 
Dağıtım, 3rd Edition, 2006) 44 
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agriculture.24 Then, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom decided to join the 
Community. At the same time, new social and environmental politics were come into effect 
and European Regional Development Fund was established in 1975.25 Greece joined the 
Community in 1981 and Spain and Portugal followed it in 1986. In 1985, the European 
Commission under the presidency of Jacques Delors published the White Book containing 
the timetable regarding the completion of European Single Market in 1 January 1993.26 The 
new European Union Treaty which was adopted in December 1991 in Maastricht by the 
European Council consisting of the member countries, the president and the prime ministers 
came into force in 1 November 1993 and the Maastricht Treaty which added the 
cooperation regions among the governments to the existing structure of united Community 
established the European Union (EU).27 In 1995, Sweden, Denmark and Finland joined the 
union. After this, the countries that cut loose from the Soviet Union lined up to be a member 
of the European Union. The EU indulged this enterprise which will bring about stabilizing the 
Continental Europe and making these young democracies benefit from the association of 
Europe.28 The negotiations for the future memberships began in December 1997. EU’s 
expansion up to 25 countries as a result of expansionary politics was realized by the 
participation of 10 countries out of 12 candidates in 1 May 2004. Lately, Bulgaria and 
Romania joined the Union in 1 January 2007. 
5. REACTIONS OF TURKEY TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE UNION29 
Turkey applied for the full membership of the Community in July 1959 after the 
establishment of European Economic Community in 1958. The equating of westernization 
and modernization has lead the Republic of Turkey to join all the politic and security 
formations established in Europe or by centering  it especially after the World War II since its 
establishment and even earlier. In this way, Turkey joined the European Council, OECD and 
NATO. Thus, it can be said that the aims of integration with the Europe have been political 
rather than economical for Turkey since the beginning.  In the reply by the European 
Economic Community then for the full membership application, it was reported that the 
                                                             
24 Pascal Fontaine, AB Nedir? (European Commission)  10 
25 Ibid. 10 
26 Ibid. 10 
27 Ibid. 11 
28 Ibid. 11 
29 All the information is taken from the web page of ABGS unless otherwise specified.  
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development level of Turkey was not adequate for fulfilling the requirements of the full 
membership and an association agreement which will be valid until the realization of full 
membership circumstances was suggested and the said agreement was signed in Ankara in 
12 September 1963.  The agreement has proposed three periods as preparatory period, 
transitional period and final period. And at the end of the preparatory period, the 
completion of the customs union was planned. By the end of preparatory period proposed in 
the agreement, the provisions of the transitional period and the obligations of the parties 
were determined by the Additional Protocol signed in 13 November 1970 and come into 
force in 1973. Turkey avoided fulfilling its obligations arising from the Additional Protocol 
because of the economical crisis in 1970 and some political preferences. When Turkey 
started not to fulfill its obligations and to discountenance the relations with the Community, 
Community started to hinder its obligations and avoid endeavoring to improve the 
partnership relation. At the beginning problems were just economical but these problems 
acquired political dimensions in 12 September period and with the Greece’s becoming full 
membership of the Community in 1980. Relations of Turkey-Community were frozen and 
financial cooperation was terminated. All the provisions of Additional Protocol were 
continued to work but the commercial clauses. EU Commission suggested in its response to 
our application for full membership in 1989 that the Community should complete the 
deepening process inside and be waited for its next expansion and meanwhile customs 
union process with Turkey should be completed while accepting the capability of Turkey 
regarding the EU membership. At the end of the negotiations lasted for 2 years, pursuant to 
the decision made in the Association Council meeting in 5 March 1995, the customs union 
between Turkey and the EU came into effect in 1 January 1996. After these processes, 
Turkey was accepted and announced as the EU candidate country unanimously in the 
Summit of EU Heads of State and Government in Helsinki dated 10-11 December 1999 and it 
was stated clearly and precisely that Turkey would be equivalent to the other candidate 
countries. To follow and conduct the EU relationships better and started to work within this 
respect, Secretariat General for EU Affairs (now Ministry for EU Affairs) were established in 
Ankara.  As a result of the following developments, it was noted in Brussels European 
Council Summit that Turkey was meeting the political criteria sufficiently and it was decided 
that accession negotiations would be started in 3 October 2005.  
 11
Needless to argue, Turkey has tried to adopt its economical, legal and political system 
according to European Union standards since the beginning of the relationship. When we 
look at the adaptation process through expected reforms, Turkey managed to implement 
many reforms to become more democratic and liberal state, namely to reach the European 
(Copenhagen) standards. Nevertheless, reform implementation process has been 
interrupted with some relevant reasons in the specific time periods and these reform 
implementations have never been on the expected level to become a member of the EU. 
Still, after the Helsinki Summit, Turkey has started comprehensive reform process to fulfill 
the Copenhagen Political Criteria which is the pre-condition of the starting full membership 
negotiations.30 Turkey made the necessary arrangements to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria 
with the Constitutional changes, revision of basic legal codes and harmonization packages. 
Within this concept, Government made Constitutional changes in 2001 and 2004. In 
addition, government announced eight “harmonization packages” which have made 
revolutionary impact people’s life in Turkey including religious freedom and minority 
rights.31 As a result, European Council confirmed that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen 
criteria. Thereby, Turkey and EU started negotiations in 2005.  
Since the Ankara Agreement, Turkey was governed by very different political parties, but all 
of them showed great interest in becoming a member of EU. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, 
founder of the Republic of Turkey, believed that Westernization is necessary to reach the 
level of contemporary civilization. Westernism was one of the principles of M. Kemal 
Atatürk’s in external affairs. New founded Republic followed a path to have close 
relationships with the western world although Republic of Turkey had fought against 
western powers. Atatürk also played important role in modernization process by his both 
internal and external policies to adapt Turkey modern life. Namely, when Turkey decided to 
reach and go beyond developed countries level, he shaped his external policies by 
developing relationships with western countries. As a definite result, Turkey moved to 
become a part of modern civilization by having good relationships with western countries. 
Therefore, all the governments in Turkey formed their external politics according to these 
policies and made an effort to become a part of the Western world and member of the 
                                                             
30 ABGS, Türkiye’de Siyasi Reform Uyum Paketleri ve Güncel Gelişmeler (ABGS, Ankara 2007) 3 
31 Ibid 21 
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European Union.32 On the other hand, there has been always an opposition both from public 
and political actors to these relationships of Turkey with Western (European) countries.  
Of course, relationship with European Union also had one’s share from these criticisms. 
Some people strongly stood against of being member of European Union. Some of them 
criticized the general concept of relationships33 and political parties like CHP and MHP 
criticized the some reforms have been implemented.34  
Beyond doubt, most of the criticisms were made to the political reforms in this mutual 
relationship. In general, people mostly supported the membership of Turkey to the union 
even though it shows a decrease in recent years35. On the other hand, citizen often stood 
against the specific political reform implementations such as freedom of religion and 
minority rights.  
These two topics are very important, problematic and sensitive issues in Turkey and the 
reasons lied down in the history itself. In addition, these concepts are sometimes being 
misused and overlapped in Turkey. Definition of minorities in Turkey is classified according 
to religion (in the Lausanne Treaty - 1923) and Republic of Turkey only acknowledges 
Armenian, Jewish and Greek people as minorities.36 Rest of the unrecognized minorities in 
society has not being seen as a minority group. 
As we all know, Copenhagen criteria especially sensitive in political reforms. Therefore, after 
starting full negotiations process in 2005, European Union demanded from Turkey to be 
more active in implementing minority rights and religious freedom reforms. Within this 
context, European Commission asked Turkey to implement concrete reforms to provide 
citizens better standards such as minority rights, cultural rights, protection of minorities and 
freedom of religion.37 When we look at the Turkey side, these reform calls have not 
welcomed by the all of the political actors and citizens. Moreover, most of the citizens also 
reacted negatively to these reforms. As I said earlier, there have been sympathy (even 
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though it shows a decreasing tendency) to become member of EU in society, but I cannot say 
the same things about religious freedom and minority rights reform implementations. 
People who have believed that these religious freedom and minority rights reforms will be 
good for themselves tried to use these reforms and the pressure of EU as an external force 
for their own sake. On the other hand, people who have been against of these reforms 
reacted very negatively not being implemented of such reforms. If we look deeper to the 
historical events in the Turkish history, then we can easily understand why most of the 
people stand against these reforms. 
6. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MINORITY RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM IN TURKEY 
Historical events always become important for the countries to shape their future policies, 
actions and reaction. If we look at closer the reactions of people and political parties, we still 
follow the traces of the past events. Turkey is a country who faced very dramatic events in 
the past, especially before and after World War I. Capitulations and Treaty of Sevres terribly 
damaged the perspective of political actors and Turkish citizens to the minorities and 
different religious groups due to giving so many privileges to these groups.38 So, before 
analyzing the reactions of political parties and public will about religious freedom and 
minority rights reforms called by European Union, it will be very useful to examine at the 
historical background of these two topics to understand the reactions of political actors and 
public better. Turkey's approach to minority rights, which refers to the 1923 Treaty of 
Lausanne related to the religion and this concept still remains unchanged. So, historical 
backgrounds of these topics will be explained under the same concept not to damage the 
integrity.  
6.1. MINORITIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
The emergence of the minority rights in international arena depends on the birth of the 
concept of ‘religious minorities’ in 16th century with the Reform movement and at the end of 
the Holy Wars, they saw that the removal of the religious minorities was impossible and they 
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took these people under protection by the documents prepared by them.39 Minorities are 
defined in judicial literature as small groups or minority groups differing from the majority of 
the community in a country or a state in as regards their language, religion, race, culture and 
etc. With a broader definition, it is possible to define it as the citizens who are not dominant 
in the population of the country, have different features in terms of ethnic, religion, 
language and tradition and desire to protect them and depend upon the state. The Ottoman 
Empire signed a debit agreement with the non-Muslims living in the lands which it 
conquered and the security of life and property of the non-Muslims who pay poll tax are 
secured by the empire. The principal minorities within the Ottoman Empire can be counted 
as Armenians, Georgians, Latins, Assyrians, Keldanis, Maronites, Copts and Rums who are 
subject to Catholic sect, Pavlikians, Selikams and Bogomils; Gregorians, Nesturians, Jacobean 
Assyrians, Melkits; Divine, Karais and Samiris Jews; Sabiis who are of Orthodox sect.40 The 
social, judicial, political and administrative structure of Ottoman Empire has been shaped by 
faith-base called ‘nation system’ not by the basis of race. In the Ottoman Empire Period, the 
majority of the minorities based on the principal of ‘Nation System’ were forming the Rum, 
Armenian and Jewish communities. The religion of the Armenians and Rums who have 
minority status according to basis of nation are Christianity and the religion of Jews is 
Judaism. We should mention especially of something, it is a historical reality that the nations 
who were conquered and fell under another state’s or culture’s rule could not preserve their 
religion and national and cultural identity for a long time and were assimilated. Ottomans 
did not apply pressure or assimilation on different elements which fell under its hegemony. 
If there had been an opposite situation, there could not have left any other religion than 
Islam, any other language than Turkish and any other nation than Turks in the lands which 
were under Ottoman’s rule over five centuries and this situation is not as a result of the 
state’s failing or negligence, it is related to ‘Zimmi Law’ enforced consciously and 
commanded by the Islamic Law and is a result of the sentimentality which the state had.41 
The minorities obtained extensive rights in the subjects related to public order in 
congregational matters and in the subjects related to private law such as family, marriage, 
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divorce, heritage matters and etc. In Ottoman administration and in the framework of the 
rights accorded to them by Islamic Law. It means that they had many rights and liberties 
which the Muslim people had.  When Fatih Sultan Mehmet conquered Istanbul in 1453, gave 
the communities there the rights such as using their own language, being educated in their 
own language, living their religion and beliefs freely, living their own culture and traditions 
and continuing their historical existence in peace and safety. 
The rights and liberties given to the minorities in the time of Fatih and the next sultans 
caused new regulations in the fields of policy, administration, law, economy, commerce and 
culture because of the state’s falling from power in time and because the minorities did not 
find them sufficient as a result of the provocations of the Western Countries.42 However, 
because these new regulations were as a result of the pressure of Western Countries, they 
were not only inadequate for preventing the state from dismemberment but also caused the 
Western Countries’ interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire by using the 
minority rights as an excuse. 43 
6.2. THE RESCRIPT OF GÜLHANE AND EDICT OF REFORM 
‘Nation System’ has met a lot of needs then in respect of the experience of living together in 
Ottoman Empire, however particularly after the 18th century, it has remained incapable 
because the steadiness in the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into the influence of 
mental and industrial developments in the west.  When this incapability combined with the 
issue that how and in which way the Ottoman Empire would be shared which the Westerns 
called as the East problem, there appeared the Minorities Issue which was the shortest way 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottomans.  Western countries endeavored to 
achieve their goals on the Ottoman Empire on the plea of protecting the people of their own 
sect and began to use non-Muslims in the country in line with their own interests and goals. 
It is necessary not to think that the Ottomans acted in a quiet and indifferent manner 
towards the said developments. However, it is almost impossible for a weak country in the 
political arena to gain a place in international relations. Ottoman Empire decided to review 
the situations of the citizens from the minorities by virtue of the external pressure and that 
was why the Rescript of Gülhane and Edict of Reform were born. At the same time, notice of 
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these reforms did not mean that everything was solved. There had been many problems 
during the implementation process. Neither non Muslims nor Muslims were ready to these 
changes and both sides had infelicities.  By the Rescript of Gülhane, the minorities (non-
Muslims) had the prerogatives in terms of law, taxing, military service and education and 
etc. and the situation of minorities went in their favor with the western pressure.44 Muslim 
people reacted negatively towards this event and the most significant reason of this was that 
the people could not adapt to the sudden and unexpected reforms.45 In the next years, the 
Western Countries did not find the reforms resulting from the Rescript of Gülhane sufficient 
and continued to apply pressure on the Ottoman Empire and as a consequence of this Edict 
of Reform was declared in 1839.46 With this reform movement, they obtained new rights in 
the fields of basic rights and liberties, religious freedoms, education, civil service and the 
military service. This edict also met with reaction in the same way by the Muslim people due 
to the concessions made for the non-Muslims.47 The nationalist movements which gained 
impetus in consequence of the French Revolution influenced the Ottoman Empire in a 
negative way beyond any doubt.  In this case, the two groups who were trying to gain 
advantage the most were the Rums and Armenians and these two nations worked and 
fought against Ottoman Empire both in disintegration period and national struggle period 
(The age of Republic of Turkey).48 The Ottoman Empire who lost in the World War I has been 
insisted on signing Armistice of Moudros and the lands of Ottomans have been shared by 
the Allied Powers.49 Then, Sevres Treaty was signed on 10th of August, 1920 among Allied 
Powers and Ottoman Empire government which could not be brought into force because of 
ongoing Salvation War. This was commented as foreign forces showed their interest to split 
the country by using minorities and they moved according to. On the other hand, with the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey fought against external powers and this war led 
us to the Lausanne Peace Conference. At the end of this complex situation, both sides came 
to an agreement and Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24th of July, 1923.  
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6.3 RECENT SITUATION OF MINORITIES IN TURKEY  
Minority issue has always been a problematic topic in Turkey.  Even though minorities were 
welcomed during the Ottoman Empire, situation has changed after the collapse has begun 
for Ottoman Empire. It is told that minorities were used to split the Ottoman Empire and all 
the rights given to minorities were described as “privileges” like I mentioned earlier.  
Therefore, reflections of these situations were not welcomed very well after foundation of 
Republic of Turkey. Even today, both ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey face terrible 
events and discriminations both from public and state. Under the light of these historical 
facts, reform demands about religious freedom and minority rights by EU were not 
welcomed by Turkish political parties and citizens. It is not surprise that Turkish side reacts 
negatively to these reform implementations while they still remember what happened in the 
past.   
Basic text about the minorities and minority rights in Republic of Turkey is Lausanne Peace 
Treaty50 and there is no other specific rights provided to minorities in Turkey. According to 
Lausanne, only Greek, Armenian and Jewish people in Turkey are described as minority. 
Nevertheless, Lausanne provides some rights to the minorities in Turkey. On the other hand, 
it is not coincidence that minorities’ definition is limited with the religious criterion and 
minorities defined as non-Muslim. While Turkey was having concern for integrity and unity, 
foreign forces showed their interest by aiming to split the country.51 Provided minority 
protection in the Lausanne Treaty was prepared properly according to two way protection of 
the period. According to this, real equality by providing some private rights for the minorities 
was intended to ensure without suffering any discrimination for minorities and recognition 
of equal rights and freedoms like all citizens as well as providing some specific rights to 
continue their own language, culture and traditions.52 
Lausanne Treaty has a different significance by surviving nowadays.  Even though it is not 
providing comprehensive protection for minorities, it provides sufficient protections. 
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However, despite of treaty’s provisions are superior norm for the domestic legislation, it is 
debatable that treaty provisions are performed correctly in daily life.53 
However, Turkish constitutional order is “addressing” the minority problem without 
touching on this issue and there is no reference in the Constitution to the “minority” word 
and even to Lausanne minorities.54 In addition, foreign policy of Turkey regarding 
international conventions is in an endeavor to ensure that legal protection would not be 
given any other minority than the non-Muslims.55 In Turkey, the minorities which differ from 
the majority on the basis of ethnicity, sect and mother tongue are not recognized by the 
laws; the number of the people connected to various minority groups is not known because 
the state does not ask questions as regards their ethnic, religious and other origins in the 
population censuses and no scientific research exists regarding the number of the 
minorities in Turkey.56  
Caucasians who are wrongly considered as Circassians are formed by various Caucasia-
rooted nations as follows: Abkhazians, Chechens, Daghestanis, Ossetians and various Turki 
communities and there are other minorities in Turkey such as the Kurds, the Laz, the 
Romany, the Armenians, Arabs (Alevi, Sunni and Christian), Bulgarians, Bosniacs, Pomaks and 
Albanians.57 In addition to this, Alevis, Armenians, Assyrians, Caferis, Jews, reformist 
Christians, Rum Orthodox Christians and Yezidis are also religious minorities.58 
In Turkey, minorities experience difficulties in regards to learn their own language, to name 
their children and the places where they live with the names of their own language, to be 
able to use minority languages to access to public services, freedom of religion, thought and 
conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, political 
participation and participation in the public life and property rights.59 Furthermore, the legal 
statute in the country has been regulated to the detriment of both ethnic and religious 
minorities. 
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Undoubtedly although there are mostly negativities, thanks to the EU harmonization 
packages and EU bills for reformation after 2005, some positive developments are 
happening. In this context, it can be advocated that the greatest success is the manner to 
create a field for various minority groups in which different identities should be recognized, 
the monopolistic concept of Turkish citizen should be reformulated and in which they can 
demand that the obstacles before freely enjoying the religious, political and cultural rights 
should be removed.60 
However, although there are many minorities in Turkey, the general arguments are over 
Alevis and Kurds. The minority issue in both media and policy is always about Alevis and 
Kurds and developments relating other minorities scarcely occupy the political agenda. 
Although the news is made due to the EU visits regarding Christian minorities, other 
minorities barely occupy the agenda. In this context, religious and ethnic minorities which 
occupies the political agenda of the country the most shall be focused on and the reactions 
to these shall be included.  
6.4. ALEVIS IN TURKEY 
Shiism is a belief system of people which carries the holiness of Allah, Muhammed and Ali 
and does not leave from their justice, based on humanity, respectful to all religions and 
belief, no respecter of persons; provides the principle of watching hands, waist and tongue; 
let people live their own way and judge themselves by themselves; defends participatory, 
equitable, sharing idea; does not depend on puritan rules of religious law and reject them; 
interprets Islam according to itself except Sunni belief; aspires to create virtuous people;  
overcome the fear and slant to God; puts the manners and morality in the center of life, 
sublimes the human; perceive the religion as a belief instead of shape and style; compounds 
the religion with reason and faith integrity and implements all of these with the inspiration 
taken from Cem House.61 
Alevis continued their existence in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and 
Azerbaijan since ancient times. Alevis have approximately 20 million populations with Turk, 
Kurd, Zaza, Arabian, Roman and other ethnic identities and they generate almost one third 
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of the Turkey population. Alevis have different way of life from other part of society in 
Turkey with their belief and cultural life. 
Concealing their belief, characterized as heterodoxy, under the Ottoman persecution of 
Si’ism, the Alevis transmitted their belief system through esoteric knowledge, secret rituals 
and local kinship, and welcoming the foundation of Republic in Turkey because of its secular 
character, Alevis continued to live mainly in Anatolia around the cities in the banks  of 
Kizilirmak, and kept their belief system, based on reverence for Ali (Mohammed’s cousin and 
son-in-law), the recognition of the trinity consisting of Allah-Mohammed and Ali, and 
performance of religious ceremony, ‘cem’, led by  dede- member of hereditary priestly  
caste- through ritual dances called  Semah, reading poems and singing in places of worship 
called ‘cemevi’ (cem houses) in a hidden way until recent times.62  But, the situation changed 
after 1960s with the urbanization process in Turkey and Alevis started to live in the poor 
neighborhoods of major cities. Alevism was rediscovered as an identity and organizational 
activities increased through associations such as Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultur and Promotion 
Assosications from 1960s to 1990s and secretion of Alevi identity diminished compared to 
past years because of the rising identity politics in Turkey.63 Moreover, Alevi organizations 
which created outside of Turkey created very huge pressure on Turkey’s policies about Alevis 
and by the late 1980s, European Integration process revealed a new context for the reborn 
of Alevi movement and Turkey’s effort to become EU member made the Alevi movement 
much more powerful with ties in Europe.64  
6.5. KURDS IN TURKEY 
The Kurds, who are supposed to have 30 million populations and it is believed that they are 
the largest stateless group in the world.65 A largely Sunni Muslim people with their own 
language and culture, most Kurds live in the generally contiguous areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, 
Armenia and Syria – a mountainous region of southwest Asia generally known as Kurdistan 
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("Land of the Kurds")66. Turkey is country which reserves the most crowded Kurdish 
population among Middle East countries. Roughly, 20 million Kurdish people live in Turkey. 
According to KONDA research institution’s research which have it made by Milliyet News, 
%13,4 of the 50 thousand people described themselves as Kurd and by adding people under 
18 years old, this rate raised to %15,68. When we adapt this statistic to the total population, 
this almost equals to 11.445 million Kurdish People.67 In the report which was published by 
Democratic Society Party (now BDP), there are 15-20 million Kurds in Turkey, 12-15 million in 
Iran, 4,5-5 million in Iraq, 1,5-2 million in Syria; there are 0,5-1 million Kurds in Caucasus and 
Middle Asia countries, and there are 1,5-2 million Kurds in Europe immigrated with different 
reasons (in total more than 35 million).68  
Kurdish people in Turkey have suffered due to decisions of state. In 1924, use of Kurdish 
language was forbidden in official sphere, including schools although protection of Kurds 
was guaranteed with the Treaty of Lausanne.69 Up until now, there has been some major 
uprising since 1925. With the decisions of state, an uprising led by Sheikh Said occurred, but 
it was suppressed and results were brutal.70 Another uprising occurred in Ararat in 1930 and 
the other one occurred in Dersim in 1938 and both of these uprisings also suppressed 
brutally.71  There have been some positive developments after 1960 constitutional change. 
However, after 1980 military coup, new 1982 Turkish Constitution re-limited the liberal 
decisions of 1961 constitution. Villages were renamed with Turkish names and usage of 
Kurdish language was forbidden again. Since then, Turkish state and PKK fought each other, 
lasted 15 years and 37,000 people died.72  
In later process, Kurdish people were subject to violence such as torture, arbitrary arrests, ill-
treatment, electric shock treatment, rape and displacement of Kurdish people from their 
villages.73 With the help of EU-Turkey relationships and pro-EU reforms, Turkey aimed to 
catch European standards on human rights, minority rights and democracy. Although 
nothing has clearly solved, there has been positive steps from both sides to end the conflict. 
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EU accession process of Turkey is an opportunity for Kurdish people to find a way out for 
their problems.  It is for sure that, a political dialogue among Turkey and Kurds is an asset to 
solve the problem rather than armed conflict.  
6.6. WHY ALEVIS AND KURDS REJECT BEING MINORITY IN TURKEY 
Both Alevis and Kurds are defined as a minority according to international standards while 
they reject the Turkishness upper identity. The situation can be described like this in 
theoretical ways but when we look at the practical ways, situation differs. Both state and 
these two groups have a common in one way: Both Kurds and Alevis are not minority. Kurds 
and Alevis in Turkey are counted as a minority according to internationally accepted four 
objective criteria which are; (1) to be citizen, (2) to be low in population, (3) Not to be 
dominant: In a sense, they were not the dominant side in the society. In contrast, they were 
dominated and precluded. Kurdish people have not named their children names in Kurdish 
language. To learn or to read their mother tongue has been prohibited. Alevis are humiliated 
and affronted as “Kızılbaş” (Redhead). They have just started to conduct their religious 
ceremony overtly, and (4) to be different: which the most important one.74 Nevertheless, the 
fifth and subjective criteria such groups cannot be defines as minority: If a group rejects 
being minority, they cannot be defined as a minority. But, the situation is different in this 
case. The reasons why Kurds and Alevis reject as being minority are that minorities are 
defined as a “rascally” in Turkey and they faced terrible discriminations.75 Even today, 
minorities in Turkey are treated as second class citizen. In addition, according to B. Oran, 
these two groups reject being minority because they define themselves as a “founder 
element” and this feeling brings them into same position with Turks who see themselves as 
a “founder element” and All these groups define themselves as a “founder element” and 
embrace the Turkey.76  
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When we look at all these processes, important developments were experienced regarding 
minorities (or about non-Muslims) and these developments were not welcomed well from 
high state officials and public both in Ottoman Empire and new founded Republic of Turkey. 
As a result, both public and state mostly met negatively reforms regarding these two issues 
and moved according to this. Thus, citizens and state have carried out these inerasable 
traces of history until today and this situation have reflected to the actions of them. One 
must keep mind that EU-Turkey relationships and EU’s reform expectations about religious 
freedom and minority rights should be evaluated according to historical facts as well. As well 
as the discussing the decisions and attitudes of citizens and Republic of Turkey is another 
issue; we should know that all the decisions have been taken by state and citizens are 
related to these deep traces of history and should be evaluated according to it. Within this 
psychological trauma, these two reform expectations by EU were not welcomed in Turkey. 
Governments and other political actors shaped their politics according to these facts. As a 
matter of fact, government has not made a concrete working since 2005 and deficiencies still 
continue. Other political parties also did not support the reform expectations of EU 
regarding religious freedom and minority rights. Surely, there have been some positive steps 
but these progresses are not at satisfactory level as mentioned in the EU Commission Turkey 
Progress Reports.  As part of religious freedom, US government’s independent institution 
United States Independent Religious Freedom Committee (USIRFC) mentioned in the 2010 
religious freedom report of Turkey that there has been some progress but these progress 
were not in the expected level and possible problems still continue. As stated in the report, 
“Minority religious groups also faced difficulties in freedom of worship, registration with the 
government, and the training of their followers and clergy. Although religious speech and 
persuasion was legal, some Muslims, Christians, and Baha'is faced restrictions and occasional 
harassment for alleged proselytizing or providing religious instruction to children.”77  
In addition, even though there are some positive steps, inconveniencies still continue about 
ethnic minorities as well. According to Human Rights Watch report, the government made 
some progress to improve the human rights of Kurds in Turkey.78 Yet, at the same report, 
according to UN Human Rights Council’s May evaluation which is done periodically, “Turkey 
argued that it was already implementing many of the recommendations made, but notably 
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refused those that would bring its definition of minorities in line with international law, or to 
wave its reservations to international law that upholds minority rights.”79  
To have deeper knowledge about the topic, I will analyze the reactions of related political 
actors and citizens. To understand and evaluate the reactions of Turkey side better, keeping 
in mind the historical background of Turkey as mentioned above will give us much more 
definite ideas. Before that, it will be better to mention about the reports of EU commissions 
and discourses of EU officers about religious freedom and minorities for keeping the 
integrity of the topic. 
7. EUROPEAN UNION REACTIONS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND MINORITY RIGHTS REFORMS IN TURKEY 
Candidate member countries to become a member of European Union need to fulfill the 
required criteria. After Turkey officially became candidate member, EU has demanded from 
Turkey to implement necessary political reforms and religious freedom and minority rights 
issues are some of these reforms. Due to main focus of this thesis are  religious freedom and 
minority rights reforms, I will try to explore the reactions of European Union by analyzing 
Turkey progress reports  from 2006 to 2010 and discourses of EU representatives and some 
groups in EU Parliament in this section.  
7.1. PROGRESS REPORTS ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
7.1.1. 2006 – 2010 PROGRESS REPORTS80 
When we look at the progress reports, EU mostly criticized the reactions of Turkey to 
religious freedom reform. From 2006 to 2010 many issues remained unsolved and limited 
developments were observed by European Commission. To give some examples of EU’s 
concerns about religious freedom: 
Limitations continue about education of religious functionaries and work of the foreign 
religious functionaries.  Preaching and broadcast of Department of Religious Affairs and local 
religious quarter can sometimes exhibit hostile attitudes against missionary activities. Some 
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attacks were recorded against non Muslim group’s worships and religious functionaries. And 
Alevis face difficulties to open worships. Cem houses have not recognized as worship and 
can not get any money from formal institutions. Children of Alevis are forced to attend 
religious courses which is not recognized their own individuality.  
Even though there has been some progress about adoption of the Law on foundations and 
the Government has started a dialogue with the Alevi and non-Muslim religious 
communities, the implementation of the Law and the resolution of the property-related 
issues regarding non-Muslim communities remains a huge problem. The environment as 
regards religious freedom has not been conducive to the full respect of this right in practice. 
A legal framework has not established yet in line with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). So, that all religious communities can function without meaningless limitations. No 
satisfying progress was reported on the major difficulties faced by the Alevis and non-
Muslim religious communities.  
EU pointed out that Turkey needs to make more efforts to create an atmosphere proper to 
full respect for freedom of religion in practice and to continue consistent initiatives targeted 
at improving dialogue with the various religious groups. As we can see from the reports, 
same concerns have remained unchanged and only little progress have made. Turkish 
government avoids the suggestions of European Union and people still suffer from 
government and public actions.    
7.2. REACTIONS ABOUT MINORITY RIGHTS 
7.2.1. 2006 – 2010 PROGRESS REPORTS81 
EU commission also criticized the reactions of Turkey to the minority right reform. According 
to the progress reports, Turkey is not willing to implement minority rights reform called by 
European Union. To give some examples of EU’s reactions about religious freedom: 
EU has some concerns about minority issues such as freedom of religion. According to EU, 
attitude of Turkey on minority rights continues to be in the same way.  Under the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish authorities suggest that minorities in Turkey form only from 
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non-Muslim religious communities. The minorities united by the authorities in practical 
terms with the Treaty of Lausanne are Jews, Armenians and Greeks. Nevertheless, there are 
other communities in Turkey which could be regarded as minorities considering the relating 
international and European standards.  
Turkey’s precondition towards the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as 
regards the rights of minorities which were challenged by several EU Member States on the 
grounds that they are not compatible with the objective and purpose of this Covenant, and 
its precondition to the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as 
regards the right to education, are at stake. Moreover, Turkey has not signed the Council of 
Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Limited progress has been made in the area of 
education. The 2005 recommendations of the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) on school curricula and textbooks as well as on the functioning of minority 
schools continue to be acceptable. In order to take discriminatory language out of the 
textbooks, further endeavors should be made. The management of the minority schools 
involving the dual presidency is still a matter of concern. Two local TV channels in Diyarbakır 
and one radio in Şanlıurfa were allowed for broadcasting in Kurdish regarding cultural rights. 
Nonetheless, excluding films and music programmes, time restrictions are implemented. The 
Turkish Public Television (TRT) has continued broadcasting in five languages without 
excepting Kurdish. However, the duration and scope of TRT's national broadcasts in five 
languages is very restricted. No private broadcaster at national level has recourse to 
broadcast in languages other than Turkish since 2004 in which legislation was enacted.  
Children whose mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn their mother tongue in the 
Turkish public schooling system, thus, private education institutions are required to ensure 
this. As for Kurdish all such courses were closed down in 2004. Thus, there is no chance to 
learn Kurdish today in the public or private schooling system. Moreover, no measures are 
taken to simplify access to public services for those who do not speak Turkish. As noted 
above, according to the Law on Political Parties, in political life, to use a language other than 
Turkish is unlawful. And the court case against the Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR) 
concerning a speech in Kurdish carries on. . 
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As a result, approach to minority rights remains limited in Turkey. Fully respect to language, 
culture and fundamental rights in line with European Standards has not provided yet. Turkey 
needs to spend more effort to improve tolerance to minorities and involve them into 
society. In addition, there has been some progress about cultural rights by some more 
liberalizing the usage of Kurdish in jails and both radio and TV broadcasts. Another TV 
channel started to 24 hours broadcast which has Arabic language besides TRT 6.  Legal 
framework is open to discussion in usage of different languages than Turkish and practice is 
inconsistent. 
To sup up, EU Commission states that there are some progresses but they are not in the 
expected level. It is very clear that commission reports show that European Union is not 
satisfied not being implemented of these two reforms by Turkey and EU demands further 
steps towards implement religious freedom and minority rights reforms.    
8. REACTIONS OF EU REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHER GROUPS IN EU 
In addition to progress reports, other groups and some representatives in EU also declared 
their opinions about these reform implementations in Turkey. If we look at some examples 
of these discourses: 
European Parliament Christian Democrat Group declared their expectations from Turkey to 
implement religious freedom reforms by saying that “Religious freedom must be provided in 
Turkey. Christians in Southeast Anatolia expect so many things from state” and European 
Parliament Socialist Group Richard Howitt also points out the necessity of religious freedom 
reform implementation in Turkey and AKEL-Takis Hadjigerorgiou declared his concerns and 
reform expectations about minorities.82  
EU Parliament Rapporteur Ria Oomen-Ruijten also pointed out that there are some 
problems about implementing reforms and conflicts in politics and public obstruct the 
reform implementations and to the question of problems related to Kurdish people such as 
not being able to speak their own language;  Ria Oomen-Ruijten answered as “More 
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democratic solution must be found for the Kurd problems under the democratic opening”. 83 
In addition, Helene Flautre talked about Kurdish problem. Flautre wanted to be considered 
of citizenship rights again.84 In addition, Cas-Granje pointed out that there are pressures on 
Kurdish newspapers and also stated that despite of improvements about human rights 
issues in Turkey, further steps need to be taken.85  
Moreover, the interview I had in Brussels with one of the representative of EU also says that 
Turkey had reasonable progress but after being candidate member and fulfilling Copenhagen 
criteria “sufficiently”, Turkey needs to implement more challenging and sensitive reforms 
such as freedom of religion and minority rights and these efforts need to be carried out in 
the future. In addition, she pointed out that “sufficiently” fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria 
should not stop Turkey rustling about political reforms. On the other hand, she mentioned 
some positive steps in freedom of religion like Halki orphanage was given back to 
patriarchate and given nationality to the Greek Orthodox clerks but also mentioned that 
these steps are not enough and more has to come.  
About minority rights, she says that Turkey has started the “Kurdish Opening” but the 
process of implementation is questionable. She also added that Turkey is on the right 
direction but there are more to be done about it.  In addition, she points out that promises 
given to Alevis should be implemented now or it will have to be done anyway in the future.  
About missioners, she points out that attitude of civil society needs to change in Turkey. She 
also tells that these reforms actions should not only include government or political parties 
but also the public and for example citizens in Diyarbakir, Kars or Antalya should be informed 
about these reforms. She finally says that a necessary consensus should be provided 
between the political actors and everybody should participate in this process, because 
everybody will benefit from the membership of EU in the end.  
To sum up, we can clearly notify that different groups in Parliament, Officers or Commission 
reports show that Turkey is not performing well in implementing religious freedom and 
minority rights reforms. They point out some positive steps but they do not think this will be 
enough to join union and Turkey must spend more efforts in these issues. It may not be easy 
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for Turkey to get quick results but all the government, opposition parties, related political 
actors and public should provide a consensus to implement these reforms. Therefore, 
Turkey’s membership process gain impetus and Turkey show its ambitious to become 
member of European Union. 
9. REACTION OF TURKEY SIDE TO THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
MINORITY RIGHTS REFORMS 
Religious freedoms and minority rights reforms which EU demanded from Turkey have been 
commented in different ways both by public and politics. Generally, however, the 
repercussions of the events experienced in the past underlie the reactions of both public and 
political actors in Turkey. The use of both ethnic and religious minorities by the Westerners 
to divide the country both in the collapse period of the Ottoman Empire and in the years of 
foundation of the Republic has affected the attitude on minorities negatively.  Regulations 
regarding minorities after the foundation of Republic of Turkey, therefore, have remained 
limited. Today, legal regulation on minorities is still Lausanne and according to this treaty 
just Rums, Jews and Armenians have the status of minorities. Having regard to these 
matters, demands of EU relating these two issues have been reacted antecedently 
negatively by Turkey. Turkish public and political parties considers generally that the EU will 
divide the country by abusing minorities and make Christianity spread all over Turkey. The 
aspect that EU creates artificial minority to create uproar in the country exists too in the 
given reactions. Notwithstanding that the examination of the reactions by the Turkish 
political parties and the public given in the light of historical trails is another subject, by 
considering the researches and discourses we can claim that the most important reason of 
negative reactions given by EU to the demands of the religious freedoms and minority rights 
reforms is the events experienced in the past.  
9.1. PUBLIC WILL ABOUT MINORITY RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 
Before going deeper explanation about the topic, I need to clarify one thing. This study will 
be the first scientific study about reflecting the reactions of public regarding religious 
freedom and minority reforms.  There is no direct research about what public thinks about 
religious freedom and minority rights. We can see some statistics about general relationship 
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between EU and Turkey, but it is impossible to find related articles, books or magazines 
which show us what Turkish citizens think about these two reforms. So, I will attribute my 
findings according to past events such as reactions of Muslims to other religious groups and 
reactions of Turkish people to other minority groups in daily life, and the interviews I had. 
Moreover, I will use some statistics of Research Centers and some indirect scientific studies. 
As we all know, public will is very important in the EU system. Citizens can be very effective 
in decision making process by influencing decision makers.86 Within this concept, Turkish 
citizens play very critical role in implementing EU reforms, but this role is not always positive 
such as implementing religious freedom and minority rights reforms. As I mentioned earlier, 
people in Turkey support the membership of Turkey to the European Union despite of we 
see a clear decrease after 2004 spring.87 
Reactions of Turkish citizens have changed according to concept of reforms. Lately, we saw 
that referenda results were positive to change some parts of constitution and EU side 
commented that Turkish citizens are positive to implement reforms.88 However, situation is 
changing when is about implementing political reforms if they directly affect the daily life. It 
is also important that what we mean about affecting daily life. Different religious groups 
such as Alevis, Süryaniler, Ortodox; and minority groups such as Kurds will have definite 
rights such as practicing their religion and education in mother tongue if these two reforms 
are implemented. As I mentioned before, most of the citizens are strongly disagree 
implementing these reforms and giving rights to these groups. So, it is better to keep in mind 
that the reactions of Turkish people change according to topic about European Union.   
No doubt, religious freedom and minority rights strongly affect the way of people’s life in 
Turkey. People who will have more rights to practice their religion freedom freely and live 
their culture, language and etc. support these reform implementations. On the other hand, 
most of the citizens terribly stand against the implementations of these reforms due to 
different concerns. Some people think that European countries are trying to split the country 
and they are doing it via these political reform expectations and some people are afraid of 
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losing their Muslim religion.89 Therefore, people are generally afraid of changing the 
situations of daily life in Turkey.  
Arguably, there is positive correlation between discourses of political parties and the public 
will. So, discourses of political parties influence the will of public and vice versa in positive or 
negative way about EU reforms. If we think that, political parties or governments take into 
account the will of public to continue their leading role in politics. Therefore, they closely 
follow what people think and shape their both foreign and internal politics according to. It is 
also important to bear in mind that populist political party publicities are very common in 
Turkish political life. So, discourses of political parties can vary according to agenda.  
To sum up, it is not surprise that both public and political will in Turkey stand against about 
implementing these two reforms.  
9.2. REACTIONS OF PUBLIC  
Turkish citizens also evaluate the minority rights deficient like the missing description about 
minorities of Turkish state.  Actually, when the general description is wrong about 
minorities, it is not surprise the negative approach of citizens to the both religious and ethnic 
minorities.  
9.2.1. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REACTIONS 
A delegation of senior officials from various ministries visited the religious leaders of non-
Muslim groups in June. On 19th of June, Ministry of Interior published a circular about 
religious freedom of non-Muslim citizens. In the circular, they are considered to be an 
increase in individual crimes against non-Muslim countries and their places of worship.90 
According to the government researches, 99 % of population is Muslim and majority of 
Muslims is Sunni and academicians stated that there are 15-20 million Alevis in Turkey.91 
There are also several other religious groups. According to USA’s independent institution 
USIRFC, “While exact membership figures are not available, these religious groups include 
approximately 500,000 Shiite Caferis; 60,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians; 23,000 Jews; 
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20,000 Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians; 10,000 Baha'is; 5,000 Yezidis; 3,600 Jehovah's 
Witnesses; 3,500 members of various other Protestant sects; and up to 2,500 Greek 
Orthodox Christians.”92 
When we look at the history, we can see that non–Muslim religious groups faced so much 
pressure from public. One of the biggest attacks against non–Muslim groups was 
experienced in 6th and 7th September in 1955. Mainly in İstanbul and İzmir, there has been 
lynch attempts and pour actions against non-Muslim citizens, many non-Muslim citizens 
injured and some of them died and material damages were in huge dimensions during the 
two days.93In addition, these events continuously happened during last few years.  
When we look at the cases about Protestants, Samsun Agape Church leader Orhan Pıçaklar 
received many threats on 2nd of April 2007, 5 young people attacked to the Zirve Press which 
publish Christian books and Press workers Necati Aydın, Uğur Yüksel and Tilman Geske were 
brutally murdered by cutting their throats on 18th of April, 2007 and Branch of Istanbul 
Protestant Church in Eskisehir was attacked by Molotov Cocktails on 20th of May, 2007.94 
Offenders of some of these attackers were not found and cases related to these issues still 
remain to be solved in the courts.  In addition, in the 2010 Rights Violations Report, many 
cases were indicated about hate crimes, problems related to places of worship, the right to 
propagate religion, mandatory religious class, the problem of training religious leaders, legal 
entity/ right to organize, obligatory discrimination of belief and discrimination.95 
Moreover, Assyrians also received some attacks. In 2009, nephew of Mor Gabriel Priory 
Metropolitan Bishop Timetheos Samuel Aktaş and Midyat Assyrian Cultur Club President 
Yuhanna Aktaş were attacked by sticks.96 Mor Yakup Church in Nusaybin and Mor Barsawme 
Church in Mardin belongs to Assyrians were attacked twice in two months and a person who 
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opened a Turkish flag and threatened the Assyrians with a hammer during the religious 
ceremony.97 
Armenian people also faced terrible violent events in recent years.  In 2007, Agos Newspaper 
Chief Hrant Dink was murdered. The interesting part of this murder is that police and 
gendarme did not provide any protection although they received information about being 
killed of H. Dink.98 Even police and gendarme forces took photos with the murderer.99 Case 
of this hearing have not solved yet. Furthermore, Istanbul Greek Ortodox cemetery in 
Gökçeada was attacked in 2010.100  
Alevis also have government’s share from the exclusionist politics. Prime Minister’s 
comments against Alevis mentioned in the press release of Alevi Institute and added that 
“Therefore, we urge the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to stop and rescind his and 
his party’s other members’ anti-Alevi campaign and deliver a public apology for his 
discriminatory remarks.”101 Within the “Combating Anti-Discrimination and movement for 
Equality” project which was funded by European Instrument For Democracy and Human 
Rights (DIHAA) and conducted with the cooperation of Alevi Culture Institutions and Middle 
East Technical University Department of Sociology,  several interviews revealed the 
discrimination against Alevis within “Alevis and Discrimination Research”.  
Discrimination in daily life, education, school, reaching public services, military service and 
places of worships were explained by Alevis during the interviews. When we look at the 
people’s sayings, one told that assimilation is being done by giving compulsory Sunni belief 
based religious class and building mosques to the Alevi villages.102 Another Alevi citizen 
mentioned that compulsory religious class must be removed and one does not want his/her 
child to attend Sunni belief based religious class.103 Yet, another person claim that all the 
mosques in Turkey take advantage of state subsidies and Cem Houses cannot take 
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advantage of these subsides which creates discrimination.104  Furthermore, one of the 
interviews I had with a representative of Hacı Bektaş Veli Institutions Headquarters, 
representative mentioned that they receive hundreds of telephone calls regarding 
discrimination against Alevis. He also pointed out that they receive many threats due to 
defending the rights of Alevis. In addition, he said that these discriminations are being done 
by the hands of government. At the same time, he acknowledges that Alevis in Turkey do not 
have any life quarantine and Alevis receive death threats by Sunni people in daily life. 
As we can see from this broad picture, living as a non-Muslim or not being Sunni in Turkey is 
a problematic issue while they face terrible attacks by Sunni Muslim people even today. 
Sunni Muslim people do not show toleration to other religious groups and they do not want 
to live together with people from other religious groups.  In this direction, “Radicalism and 
Extremis” Research which is implemented by Bahçeşehir University and British Foreign 
Ministry in 2009 showed that how Sunni Muslim people perceive the other religions and 
atheists. According to research, % 75 of Sunni Muslims do not want atheists, % 32 of 
Muslims do not want people who do not fast, % 65 of Muslims do not want people who does 
not have any religious belief, % 52 of Muslim do not want Christian and % 64 of Muslims do 
not want Jewish people as their neighbor.105 
So, it is not difficult to make an assumption that people in Turkey are against of religious 
freedom reforms called by EU. Sunni Muslim people in Turkey see other religious groups as a 
threat themselves and they try to suppress them whenever possible (by force or illegally). In 
addition, they asses the EU reforms as a threat for their country. They believe that EU wants 
to split the country as they tried to do it after World War I. 
All in all, despite of there is no clear data about what public thinks about these two reforms, 
some researches show that people are against of European Union and EU reforms with 
different concerns. %81 of people think that EU wants to spread Christianity in Turkey, %76 
of them think that EU tries to split Turkey and %80 of people think that EU tries to split and 
weaken Islam.106 
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Although these facts are not directly connected to the reactions of religious freedom called 
by EU, we can assess that there is no general public consensus about this reform. Sunni 
Muslim people are not tolerated to the other religious groups and giving rights to other 
religious groups to live their religion freely cannot be allowed according to them. Under 
these circumstances, we can definitely say that there is no public will to implement religious 
freedom reform called by European Union.  
9.2.2. REACTIONS ABOUT MINORITY REFORMS 
Minority rights may be the most problematic issue in Turkey. As I mentioned before, 
definition of minorities still remains unchanged since the Treaty of Lausanne. Only non 
Muslim groups; Jewish, Armenian and Greeks are recognized as minority in Turkey and other 
minorities are ignored. Nonetheless, most of the minority rights discussions in Turkey have 
been over the Kurdish people. Sometimes, Roma people participate to discussions but they 
do not take an important role on the agenda. Other minorities either do not call themselves 
as minority such as Lazes or they are ignored. 
There are several minorities in Turkey but Kurds are the most crowded minority in Turkey 
with its almost 20 million population. Due to having armed conflict with PKK107, toleration 
for Kurdish people is very low in Turkey. Therefore, there is a struggle among Turkish and 
Kurdish people in public level. However, unlike other religious groups, there is not so much 
direct conflict among Turkish and Kurdish people in Turkey except terrorism. Only 
sometimes nationalist university students fight Kurdish people or people who defend 
Kurdish people’s rights and vice versa.108 Moreover, some of the Turkish; especially 
nationalist people are strongly against of being described of Kurdish people as minority. 
They do not want Kurdish people to have education in mother tongue, name Kurdish names 
for their children, etc. Mainly, some of the Turkish people are against of giving minority 
rights to Kurdish people. On the other hand, Turkish citizens are surprisingly giving positive 
feedbacks to the Kurdish opening109 which has been on the agenda since 2009.  
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A&G’s research on Kurdish opening showed us the ideas of citizens about it. The survey was 
done in Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Diyarbakır, İçel, İstanbul, İzmir, Kayseri, Malatya, Manisa, and 
Trabzon, face to face interviews were done by 260 people and %45.6 of participants said yes 
to the Kurdish opening.110 According to another Kurdish opening research which is done by 
the cooperation of Politics, Economy, and Society Researches Foundation (SETA) and 
Pollmark Research Institute, %55 of the citizens see the Kurdish problems as a significant for 
Turkey and majority of the citizens approve the Kurdish opening of government (% 43 
positive, % 39 negative).111 
On the other hand, various families of martyrs112 Association Presidents and Administrators 
made a press release in Bingöl and declared their disapproval of the Kurdish opening and 
President Ziya Sözen told in his speech that “We reunited here to react the Kurdish opening 
which is opened to discussion in public opinion. All these villages have the traces of blood 
spilled by PKK terrorist organization and these events continue to occur. Before ending this 
conflict and stop the spill of blood, talking about peace and democracy only works for 
increase the pain of families of martyrs. This Kurdish opening will cause a disintegration and 
polarization in society”113. İstanbul Mother of martyrs Association President Pakize Akbaba 
also stated that “If there is something to talk or solved, you should first talk with the families 
of martyrs. However, as far as I see, you are insistent to make this Kurdish opening. You 
cannot make it because we owe the Republic of Turkey. Our sons were killed by PKK terrorist 
organization and we wept”.114 As we can see form the perspectives of families of martyrs, 
they do not approve such opening which will give more freedom and rights to Kurdish 
people in Turkey. So, the problem seems more complicated than it appears.  
As we see, most of the Turkish citizens do not welcome the religious freedom and minority 
rights reforms. They clearly see the demands of EU as a threat to their country and they are 
afraid, because they think their country will be separated by the Christian world (European 
Union). So, do Turkish citizens right to worry about their country or is there something else?  
When EU says “minority”, it means that people can be classified as minority must have the 
same rights as majority of the society does. In other words, when Sunni people’s mosques 
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have government subsidies, other places of worship belong to other religious group also 
must benefit from subsidies of government. Both Turkish and other minority languages 
should be able to take elective language courses in schools.  
EU demands from Turkey to give more rights to minorities and minorities should really be 
same with majorities. However, minorities in Turkey are seen as non-Muslim and disruptive 
element. We still see the traces of “nation system” which is established by Ottoman since 
1454. Related articles about minorities in Lausanne also designated according to this idea. 
Due to western countries used the non-Muslims to separate the Ottoman; they are still seen 
as disruptive element in Turkey. It is not easy for many people who think in that way to 
understand the demands and reforms of EU.  
10. REACTIONS OF POLITICAL ACTORS IN TURKEY  
In this part, the EU discourses of political parties will be analyzed in order to exhibit the 
attitudes of political parties on the EU membership of Turkey which have a significant impact 
on Turkish political life. Instead of the discourses of all political parties, the approaches of 
AKP, CHP, MHP and BDP will form the basis for this analyze. In order to be able to analyze 
the discourses of AKP on EU reforms, the discourses of the party leader and the Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, of Ali Babacan, who was the chief negotiator until 2009, and 
of Egemen Bağış, of Abdullah Gül, who was the foreign affairs minister from 2005 until 
today, and of Ahmet Davutoğlu and of the other party members, of the party program and 
2007 and 2011 election affidavits of the party have been examined. And to comprehend the 
reactions of CHP to EU reforms, the speeches of Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu – 
period leaders – and the discourses of party members, the party program and 2007 and 
2011 election affidavits have been taken into account. Moreover, in order to measure the 
reactions of MHP to EU reforms, the discourses of Devlet Bahçeli and party members, of the 
party program and 2007 and 2011 election affidavits, and Turkey and Politics magazine, 
which is published by Research and Development Centre belonging to the party and which is 
published every two months, and the reports prepared by R&D Centre have been examined. 
The attitudes of BDP, consisting of the gathered independent candidates because the 
threshold is 10%, on EU reforms have been analyzed through discourses of party members, 
2011 election affidavit, party programs and regulations.  
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The relations of Turkey with European Union have been, undoubtedly, always on the agenda 
of the parties in Turkey. The approaches of parties take shape not only according to the 
origins of their own but also sometimes by populist approaches.  Although a nationalist party 
as MHP always argues against EU membership, they have positively addressed to the 
relations with EU for the sake of balances and interests in internal politics. On the contrary, a 
party as CHP which leans towards the relations with EU has acted upon the agenda by 
reprehending various reforms as minority rights in EU membership process in order to 
criticize the policies of current government and to receive votes. In spite of the fact that 
current government, AKP, argues that they completely support the EU membership and are 
prepared for the membership and act upon this, everybody has noticed that they made 
gradually less effort after 2005. In the same way, it is also a known fact that they are 
reluctant to implement reforms as regards religious freedoms and minorities. It is obvious 
that minority party BDP leans towards the implementation of minority reform whose 
implementation by EU is desired as soon as possible. Although there are other political 
parties in the country, because they appear on media in no way and they have scarcely any 
statements regarding these issues, the point of views and attitudes of AKP, CHP, MHP and 
BDP which are shaping the agenda have been examined.   
So, there are four political parties which represent country in the parliament and they are 
actively involved in shaping country’s political life. Justice and Development Party is 
Government Party and CHP, MHP and BDP are three opposition parties in the parliament. All 
these actors have their own perspectives to the minority rights reforms and religious 
freedom reforms and each actor shapes their politics according to their current position, 
political or historical background, agenda of the country and vote concern.  
10.1. PEACE AND DEMOCRACY PARTY (BDP)115  
BDP was founded in 2008. After the closure decision of Democratic Society Party by the 
decision of constitutional court in December 2009, 20 parliamentarians and 98 mayors from 
DTP joined to BDP. 
BDP defines itself as a left leaning mass party that perceives libertarian, egalitarian, peaceful, 
pluralist and multi-cultural society as richness. It adopts democratic-local and horizontal 
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style of politics in place of centralist and hierarchical politics; rejecting all forms of 
discrimination and racism. BDP sees the liberation of the humankind in the establishment of 
the free, democratic and ecological society. Peace and Democracy Party conducts a political 
struggle aware of the urgency of establishing social peace in the country and emphasizing 
the necessity of an effort to restructure the legal, administrative, political, social, economic 
and cultural arenas through comprehensive democratic reforms. In this sense, it stands as 
the organization for struggle of all social segments regardless of ethnicity, class and gender 
which live on their labor including women, the youth and different belief groups. BDP 
undertakes comprehensive effort oriented toward the implementation of urgent reforms for 
the effectuation of local democracy and conducts scientific research and discussion to this 
and. The party is a determined supporter of the EU membership process of Turkey from the 
same perspective. Peace and Democracy Party , which sees the EU not solely as a community 
of states, but also community of people; makes considerable attempts for active 
involvement in the negotiation process in order to watch closely  the implementation of 
reforms for compliance with the EU process and to ensure that the process serves the widest 
interests of society. BDP, while regarding the creation of libertarian and democratic society 
as its fundamental principle; declares, in conformity with this principle that the Turkish 
Republic has been established by the Turkish and Kurdish people and all other ethnic groups 
and that the roots of fraternity between people lies in the depths of history. Hence, Peace 
and Democracy Party perceives the solution to the Kurdish Problem and the peaceful future 
of people in the establishment of the Democratic Republic and in the principle of "free co-
existence in the common homeland". In this context, the party is a staunch supporter in all 
platforms, of organized civil society, a social structure within which people can build their 
own identities and of the making of a new constitution in conformity with universal law; one 
that promotes a peaceful, libertarian, egalitarian, and participatory society. The predication 
of the relationship between the state and religion upon the principle of democratic and 
libertarian secularism through which the state assumes a neutral role towards all religions 
which are allowed to freely express themselves is attributed primary importance by the 
party. BDP strives for the provision of the right to education in mother tongue for everyone 
without discrimination and for the establishment of a democratic conception concerning the 
press, intellectual reflections, culture and arts. 
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10.1.1. REACTION TO MINORITY REFORMS 
BDP can be defined as a minority party and it is for sure that their first goal is to defend the 
rights of Kurdish citizens in Turkey according to Party Program. 
In the party program, BDP aims generally at multiculturalism, keeping the differences alive, 
making all citizens express themselves freely, develop their culture, speak their mother 
tongue and develop it, educated in their own mother tongue and benefit from visual, 
auditory and printed media; and aims at making the idea of “Republic of Turkey Citizenship” 
which shall include all ethnic, cultural, belief and gender differences adopted instead of the 
understanding of a single race, single language, single religion, single culture and  male-
dominant society; furthermore, it has had expressions regarding that the Constitution and 
laws, such as Universal Declaration of Human Rights, should be made suitable for the 
international contract provisions to which Turkey is a party contracts which are not signed or 
approved yet should be signed and approved, and the drawbacks which are in the signed 
and approved contracts and limiting human rights and liberties should be removed.116  And 
under the title of the program named “Democratic and Peaceful Settlement for the Kurdish 
Problem”, Kurdish problems and settlements regarding this are included. The report pointing 
out that the Kurds as a minority could not benefit from the rights which they should 
according to EU reports, has drown attention to the solutions of the Kurdish problem. In this 
context, in the program, there are expressions like the existence and identity of Kurds shall 
be recognized on every level and guaranteed constitutionally, necessary regulations shall be 
made for legal right equality, constitutional guarantee shall be ensured for their language 
and cultural rights, there shall be no restrictions on radio, TV and the press, the broadcasts 
in Kurdish or other languages shall carry out their activities in the same way and with the 
same legal rules applied to Turkish radio and TV, the same legal rules and procedures shall 
be applied to cultural activities.117 It, moreover, undertakes that the Kurdish shall be used as 
education and training language, the inequalities and discriminations relating human rights 
shall be removed, every kind of violation shall be precisely eliminated, the human rights 
violations, persecutions and unsolved murders shall be investigated and offenders shall be 
judged.118 Briefly stated, BDP has articulated in the party program that they would make 
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decisions about Kurds and endevour for this. Apart from these, BDP has stated that the 
relations shall be developed on the basis of cooperation and solidarity with EU and they 
suppors the EU membership process of Turkey in the sense of democratization and shall deal 
with the harmonization process of national law about EU norms as a primary duty.119 
As it is clearly understood from this program, BDP supports the requirement of minority 
reform by EU because it serves well to internal politics of party. They clearly stated this by 
their supporting EU as I suggested above.  
In addition, in Article 3 of Party regulation, there is a statement as follows: “BDP, who see 
the EU process not only as a community of states but also as a community of nations, 
defends this process pertinaciously. BDP takes steps which will ensure active participation in 
the negotiation process with the intention that this will serve society’s interests as a follower 
of the implementation of reforms and regulations required by EU process.”120 and this 
statement shows us how BDP supports the EU minority reform.  
Selahattin Demirtaş, BDP deputy, noted in an interview, by criticizing the attitudes of EU and 
AKP, that they have a favorable opinion about reforms but the relations with EU are bad.  
Moreover, he also defended that the government was reluctant about EU reforms, that AKP 
tried to make an agreement without making necessary regulations and EU was already 
seeking a pretext.121 
Another deputy of BDP, Gülten Kışanak, stated by criticizing the government that the 
government did not implement the reforms which are required by EU membership process 
and on the contrary it blocks the rights and liberties with the laws enacted in 2005-2006.122 
Moreover,  in the Political Attitude Document On Democratization of Turkey and Settlement 
of the Kurdish Problem published by BDP, about the privileges granted by EU countries for 
the minorities to be able to speak their own mother tongue, at the same time it has also 
criticized that Turkey did not maintain an attitude on this subject  and in addition to this, 
although Turkey as a candidate of EU is one of the council countries which signed the 
European charter of local autonomy first and approved it in the parliament first, it has 
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emphasized the fact that Turkey is the only country who is chary of the article of freedom of 
association in European charter of local autonomy.123  
10.1.2. REACTIONS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
While BDP is actively involved in EU reforms concerning minority rights, they are not really 
interested in religious freedom reforms. However, they have some indirect discourses about 
freedom of religious. In the 2011 Election Bulletin, BDP mention that they will remove all the 
obstacles blocking for every person to enjoy a life regarding religious freedom. 124 
Co-chairman of BDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, has stated that they are on side of making a 
package within the scope of “freedom of religion, conscience and belief” and demanded a 
package which will provide the solutions not only for the scarf issue but also for “the 
removal of compulsory religion lesson and subject of djemevis” which Alevis demanded 
within the scope of freedom of belief and for minority problems and even for problems of 
Assyrians and Keldanis.125 
While BDP, by its basis, is supporting the EU reforms regarding minority rights 
unconditionally, they are also criticizing the inadequate acts of EU and AKP government in 
this sense. Despite this, they are using EU as a pressure tool for the Turkish government by 
saying that the positive steps will be supported. Undoubtedly, BDP is acting within their 
interests by mentioning their demand for EU reforms both in the election bulletin and their 
internal and foreign politics. Moreover, they are noting that as a country, the steps, even if 
they are indirect, should be taken about religious freedoms and they are appealing to the 
government to work through about this issue. Consequently, we can state that BDP is 
supporting these two EU reforms to be implemented in Turkey and is ready for doing any 
requirements in this sense. 
10.2. NATIONALIST MOVEMENT PARTY 
The party, which was named “CMKP”126 until 1969 and claimed its place in Turkish history, 
was named MHP by a decision made in 1969. The basis for MHP propagandas is represented 
                                                             
123Türkiye’nin Demokratikleşmesi Ve Kürt Sorununda Çözüme Dair Siyasi Tutum Belgesi  
124 BDP 2011 Election Charter 
125 İnanç özgürlüğü kapsamında bir paket hazırlanmalı (Zaman News, October 2010) 
126 Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi 16 Ekim 1958'de Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi ile Türkiye Köylü 
Partisi'nin birleşmesiyle kurulan siyasi parti. 
 43
by six arrows ideology which has revolutionary characteristics of Kemalism and Nine Lights 
which has traditional-conservative characteristics grounding on Turkish Nationalism shaped 
by Islam.  And Nine Lights are the main principles of idealism introduced as National 
Doctrine Nine Lights by Alparslan Türkeş. These principles have been classified as 
nationalism, moralism, scientism, socialism, idealism, ruralism, liberty and personalism, 
developmentism and populism and industrism and technicalism. Nationalism was the most 
important one in these Nine Lights. MHP defended an anti-capitalist anti-communist 
nationalist policy in which idealism reached to peak. MHP achieved its greatest success by 
receiving 18% vote in the parliamentary elections in 18 April 1999.  
10.2.1. REACTIONS OF NATIONALIST MOVEMENT PARTY 
A profound reform process began, in the name of democratization, in 1999 Helsinki Summit 
with the candidate status given to Turkey. In this context, the only concrete step taken by 
MHP on the way to EU, is the three harmonization packages made for meeting the political 
criteria of EU between 2002 and 2004 and with the coalition government. In the next years, 
reactions of MHP to EU reforms have changed and pursue an anti-reformist policy. In the 
documents published by MHP and in the discourses of Devlet Bahçeli, demands of reform 
about religious freedoms and minority rights have been explicitly criticized and they have 
reacted to them negatively.  I will bring the attitude of MHP to light by looking through the 
reports published by MHP and discourses one by one beginning from 2005. 
10.2.2. THE YEAR 2006 REPORT REVIEW  
MHP has reprehended the progress report published by EU in 2006 and touched on 
demands of reform about minority rights and religious freedom.  The expectations of EU 
with demands and impositions have been interpreted under two titles as negative detection 
and expectation of EU about Turkey.  
In the part of Minority Rights in report published, the statement as an obsession of EU 
on forcefully creating a Muslim national minority in Turkey is drawing attention.  
Furthermore, the reforms which EU demanded to be implemented by Turkey127 are 
highlighted. In the part of freedom of religion and worship, in the same way, the reforms 
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which EU demanded from Turkey to be implemented have been included and the steps 
taken by AKP in this sense have been reprehended. That is, the report has involved a 
statement as “To accept the imposition for AKP government who sacrificed Turkish national 
interests to get a good grade from EU is seen as a deferred ransom installment.”128 In 
addition to this, in the time of AKP government, to allow the Metropolitan Bishop who 
cannot become a Turkish citizen to become a member of Sen Sinod which is the board of 
directors of Fener Rum Patriarch in the history of Republic has been described as AKP’s 
keeping up with the games of EU. Furthermore, it accuses AKP government which is seen as 
loyal applicator of EU scenarios regarding religious minorities of not being able to see these 
facts and continuing their negligence march.  
10.2.3. 2007 ELECTION AFFIDAVIT 
In the 2007 Election Affidavit, as a reaction to all reforms expected by EU from Turkey, the 
following statement appeared: “a disappointment story full of blackmails, impositions, 
preconditions, unjustified requests and pressures.”129  
10.2.4. 13 NOVEMBER 2009 PARLIAMENT SPEECH AS REGARDS 
KURDISH OPENING 130 
The leader of MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, emphasized explicitly that they are against the minority 
reform in his speech on Kurdish initiative in 13 November 2009. Throughout the speech, he 
has defended that people living on the territories Republic of Turkey do not have different 
identities and every individual should be evaluated as Turkish nation. Moreover, with the 
expression of “minority desired to be created”131 with the initiative, there was and can not 
be any minorities.  
He also notes that they can not accept the rights given under the name of minority rights 
and any other language than Turkish can not be used in official institutions. In this respect, 
EU is seen as a disruptive power and it is implied that EU has a demolition imitative on 
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Turkey. Generally Bahçeli states that all citizens in the country are Turkish nation and thinks 
that artificially created minorities and reactions of EU will divide the country. 
Devlet Bahçeli has again put his negative reaction to minority reforms forward, in his 
writings sent by him to the organizations, by using such statements as “ Clearance of the 
nation-state and unitary structure, de-identification of our nation, artificially created 
minorities and the process seeking for devastation of a millennial fellowship embodies the 
dangers on a lasting level.”132  
10.2.5 LAST TWO YEARS OF AKP 
In the same way, in this declaration published by MHP, they gave negative reactions to the 
reforms regarding minorities and demanded by EU. In these reactions, MHP, who is pushing 
both AKP government and EU, has enunciated that they have negative reactions to the 
minority reform, religious freedoms, relations with EU and the government by noting that 
“The desire of EU, whose intent to delay Turkey with a virtual negotiation process in which 
the full membership is not the ultimate goal is clearly understood, to use this process to 
forcefully create a national minority has continued as the submissiveness of AKP whose 
forcing a series of lists focused on “The Kurdish Problem” down the government’s throat has 
been accustomed.”133 And then they show their reactions to the reforms relating religious 
freedoms by mentioning argumentatively such expressions that the status of “ecumenic” for 
Fener Rum Patriarch has been accepted and the existence of Muslim national minorities in 
Turkey has been admitted.134  
10.2.6. DESTRUCTION PROJECT OF “POLITIZATION PROCESS OF 
SEPARATIST TERROR”  
In this declaration including the developments in 2009, the hypercriticizms both to AKP 
government and EU due to the expected reforms continued similarly. Kurdish initiative has 
been again defined as a way to destruction in EU-AKP partnership 135 and EU’s demand for 
minority and religious freedoms reforms to be implemented has been interpreted as an 
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effort to divide Turkey136 and as an abuse and defamation.137 And for the effort of EU to 
divide Turkey, they have exemplified the reopening of Halki Seminary.138  
 10.2.7. EU REPORTS OF MHP (2009, 2010,2010) 
In EU reports published by MHP Research, Development and Evaluation Centre, the negative 
reactions to the reforms regarding minority and religious freedoms demanded by EU have 
carried on.  
In the 2009 report, MHP, again, has argued that the idea of EU about forcefully creating a 
national minority in Turkey is at the heart of the assignment of “Apart from the minorities 
involving in Treaty of Lausanne in Turkey, it is emphasized that there are other communities 
which should be regarded as minorities.”139 
In the part of religion freedom of EU reports, they have explained the Alevis’ being defined 
as a minority, the existence of demands by long lists relating non-Muslim citizens, the 
opening of Halki Seminary in Turkey, the permission given to Fener Rum Patriarch to use the 
“ecumenical” adjective and Turkey’s not interfering in the elections of church administration 
by arguing that the EU entrapped the country and have interpreted the steps of the 
government, which we can define as positive, as falling into this trap.140  
In a general expression, in the report such statements regarding religious freedoms and 
minority reforms as “The European Union is besotted with forcefully creating a national 
minority in Turkey. EU policies, which have made us expose the disintegration in ethnic 
basis, have not been backward in coming forward and talked about denominational 
differences.”141 included.  
In the report published in March, 2010; MHP has interpreted the expectation of 
reforms as the recognition of Ecumenical Patriarchate and opening of seminary as the 
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resurrection of Sevres in the same way that the historical facts and Sevres trauma influenced 
the reactions of the community to these reforms in the past.142  
  In addition to this, they highlighted that the expectation of Turkey’s having a new minority 
definition other than the one in Treaty of Lausanne should not be existed, Alevi and Kurd 
citizens of ours are the fundamental elements of the country, an the evaluations as regards 
ecumenism and seminary should be made within the framework of Treaty of Lausanne.143 
MHP has interpreted the statement of Hayati Yazıcı, who is the secretary of state and is 
drawing attention to that the missionaries in the country do not do their duties and who is 
saying  “If the foundation has a religious goal, of course it will work for this goal.” as “They 
granted the Crusades a visa.”144 
And in the report of December, 2010 published lastly, the heavy criticisms in 2009 about 
these two reforms have continued. All the reports of EU in this respect are interpreted as EU 
authorities’ interrogating Treaty Establishing the Republic of Turkey and Lausanne for the 
declarations, chapter that could not be opened and lasting criteria and the government’s 
consent to this.145 
MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli criticized the reform expactations in many statements of his 
made to the media by using expressions similar to the above. And at the same time, he has 
criticized the government because they took positive steps about minorities and religious 
freedoms in the last elections and used these reforms as electioneering. MHP leader has 
even equated the EU to a terrorist organization by saying in his reaction to 2008 report that 
“It is clearly a fact that the demands and impositions of EU about minority rights match up 
with the political action plan and ethnic separatism agenda of PKK."146 Devlet Bahçeli has 
interpreted the Foreign Affairs Minister’s finding the important points about minority rights 
and religious freedoms in the EU report in 2008 positive as disgraceful.147 And in another 
speech of his, Bahçeli has accused the government of being in total submissiveness to 
pressures and suggestions from inside and outside because of the responses to the reform 
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expectations of EU and of trying to weaken the all resistance and security mechanisms of our 
national and governmental life.     
It is very clear that MHP regards the expectations of EU relating minority rights and religious 
freedoms reforms as a threat to the country and criticize the EU on the grounds that they 
are aiming at divide and demolish Turkey. At the same time, MHP is pushing the government 
which is sometimes taking positive steps for this reform demand both in media and in their 
written declarations and their parliament speeches. Additionally, they are using the existing 
situation as an election material by noting that EU is requiring these reforms to divide and 
demolish the country and by reprehending the relations of AKP with EU. Undoubtedly, when 
we examine the basis of the party, it cannot be surprising that MHP is confronting the 
religious freedoms and minority reforms. Put aside arguing if it is right or not, it is extremely 
normal by politics’ nature that MHP is criticising these kind of reforms to make up to their 
own party basis and using these as election materials. In short, MHP is suggesting their 
negative opinions about religious freedoms and minority reforms demanded by EU more 
clearly than other parties and MHP is shaping their acts in this sense according to this.  
11. REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY 148  
CHP was established under the leadership of Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk by the 
name of “People’s Faction” before 9 September 1923. In 1924, its name changed to 
“Republican People’s Faction and then in 1935 to “Republican People’s Party.”  
CHP is the party which gained national independence, established the Republic, abolished 
the sultanate and caliphate and ensured National Unity under the leadership of its founder 
and first general president Atatürk. It has formulized the Republic of Turkey by the reforms 
implemented in social spheres such as law and education. It has pioneered the development 
of national industry and economy. Despite all the opportunities of one party system, it has 
continued to be the pioneer also in the democratization process of Turkey by ensuring the 
transition to a multi-party system after the World War II.    
It also led the institutionalization of opposition in a democratic regime by the opposition task 
taken on in 1950s. Within this scope, it has striven to make the changes regarding the 
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institutionalization of the parliamentary democratic regime and to develop basic rights and 
freedoms. CHP has positioned itself in “left-of-centre” in political spectrum by opening into 
the left with the maturation of social classes within the framework of dynamics such as 
immigration, urbanization and industrialization emerging as the reflections of the 
modernization process in Turkey in 1960s. In 1970s, CHP, who defines its ideology as the 
concept of “democratic left”, has aimed at the system change by social reforms offered by it. 
In this process, CHP has turned from “state party” into “people’s party” and from “system 
party” into “party of change. 
Generally, CHP pursue their policies in line with the party program consisting of 
Republicanism, Secularism, Nationalism, Statism, Populism and Revolutionism representing 
the six arrows existing in their flag. 
CHP has come into power many times in history of the republic and maintained to be the 
single party in power in the process of transition to a multi-party system and it is the party 
which has been in power for the longest time. And after AKP came into power, CHP has 
found a place in the parliamentary as the opposition party. 
11.1. REACTIONS OF REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY 
CHP is evaluating the Turkey-EU relations in the party program as “CHP is supporting the full 
membership of Turkey to EU from the beginning. The goal of Turkey of full membership to 
EU is a social change project which is a natural extension of the modernization revolution 
and modernization vision of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Our condition in relations with EU is a 
full membership which is on equal footing, respecting the formation values of our Republic 
and honorable. CHP does not accept any other choice than this.”149 Moreover, they state 
that they shall accept the adaptation of Turkey to the conditions, accepted and adapted by 
all the members, and Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria and Turkey’s adopting EU law.150 
On the other hand, although CHP is confronting that the arbitrary conditions incompatible 
with Treaty of Lausanne are tried to be accepted by Turkey in EU membership process, they 
also has stated that they are supporting resulting a reform process, compatible with the EU 
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legislation and the implementations of other countries and serving for Turkey’s interests, by 
accelerating it.151  
The reactions and acts of CHP after 2005, however, to the EU membership which is 
supported by oral and written means, tell us the total opposite of this.  After 2005, CHP has 
come into prominence by their opposition to EU membership and EU reforms. CHP, who is 
supporting first reform packages, gradually reached the position of a party preventing EU 
reforms. They continued this mostly by the annulment application to the Constitutional 
Court and in the last 5 years, most of the applications going to the Constitutional Court were 
the ones directly related to the EU reforms and CHP had always the statist and doubted 
democratic attitudes on subject like minority rights.152  
 
CHP have stated that the facility for raising reverends153 and full accession to cultural 
minority rights154 will be ensured for the minorities, and in the field of Human Rights, the 
problems deriving not only from the laws but also from the implementation will be solved 
and the minority rights deriving from International agreements will be preserved but the 
efforts for creating new minorities in society will be challenged.155 In addition to this, they 
are pointing out that religious freedoms will be respected without excluding the sects and 
the Department of Religious Affairs will be restructured in such a way that Alevis can be 
represented.156 
 
And when we examine the Centre Director’s Reports published by CHP from December 2007 
to 2010 we see parallel thoughts to the party program. The sentence in the December, 2007 
report of EU as “Turkey must think of the necessity that some of the Turkish citizens should 
have private rights on the basis of language, religion and race” has been criticized by 
claiming that it is a model of juristism.157 General President of the period, Baykal, has stated 
in this respect that, “They are trying to create a minority, an artificial minority in Turkey. 
They say to Alevis ‘You are the minority’. They say the same thing to the Kurds. Both Alevis 
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and Kurds are the equal citizens of this society. Neither of them is minorities In the same 
way, CHP general president reacted to the amendment of the Prime Minister planned in the 
Constitution in December,2008 about minorities as “It is breaching to make the minority 
creation in our Constitution possible.”158  
In the report of July, 2008, CHP’s attitude regarding minorities has been displayed by the 
expression of “discrimination of minority-majority is not made”159 one more time and it is 
obvious that they are against the EU reforms in this respect. 
In the report of August, 2009, Önder Sav has noted that Lausanne is desired to be reviewed 
again and the reform demands of EU about minorities cannot be accepted.160 
In the report of October, 2009, criticisms regarding Kurdish Initiative expressed and it is 
implied that they will not make concessions to issues as education in mother tongue, ethnic 
origins and these kinds of acts will split the country.161  
CHP leader Baykal, moreover, in his other interviews and speeches, has impeached AKP for 
religious freedoms and minorities reforms desired to be implemented in line with the EU 
demands. In a speech of his in 2006, he has said that “Let us not give the ones who want to 
create minorities by stating ‘lower identity, upper identity, he is not one of us’ 
opportunity.”162 Again, in the same way, in a speech of his in 2009 in Malatya, he has 
remarked that “There is no minorities, we are all equal” and about the “Democratic 
Initiative” works he has said that “They would not let the public to be smashed, the country 
to be frauded and the state to be divided.”163  
 
When we examine the election affidavit of CHP in 2011, we see that they do not mention 
about the political reforms, accordingly religious freedoms and minorities, in the part of 
relations with EU and these are not on their agenda. In the last years, it is definitely not 
surprising to face with this kind of outcome as a result of CHP’s confronting EU reform 
demands in order to criticize the government. 
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Consequently, it is an undeniable fact that CHP supported EU in the past and even now is still 
supporting the EU membership. However, the indicator of the real idea of CHP is the 
inconsistencies between discourses and behaviors and to often criticize the reform packages 
of the government by the populist approaches to make up to a part in the EU membership 
process and to resort to the judgment to annul these packages. We see that CHP is using 
especially these minority rights and religious freedoms reforms for their own interests not by 
supporting them but by preventing. In the last election period, CHP leader Kılıçdaroglu’s 
demands like autonomy which he offered for the Kurds164 are composed of the 
electioneering and are not sincere. As the main opposition party, CHP, has repeated that 
Lausanne should be taken into consideration about the issue of minority rights and religious 
freedoms and by stating that EU reforms are against the Lausanne, thus, these reforms 
should not be implemented and Lausanne should be preserved. To sum up, CHP, has showed 
their attitudes clearly on these two reforms and done their best to make them not 
implemented and in this respect has not avoided criticizing the government and the ones on 
reforms’ side for their own interests.  
12. JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY165 
Justice and Development Party (AKP or AK Party) is a Turkish Party which was founded by 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 
After the so-called post-modern coup of 1997, divided the Milli Görüş (National View) line 
initiated by former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan into two which were traditionalists 
and reformists. Abdullah Gül, the current president, was one of the prominent figures of 
reformists, who garnered a total of 521 out of 1,195 votes in a congress held in August 2000 
by the now-defunct Virtue Party (FP). The disbandment of the FP in 2001 on the grounds of 
being a hotbed of anti-secular activities paved the path for the establishment of a new party, 
the AK Party. The AK Party was founded on Aug. 14, 2001 under the chairmanship of Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The AK Party participated in the elections without the 
leadership of Erdoğan, who was convicted of "provoking hatred" and encouraging Islamist 
extremism in 1998 and banned from politics. The party gained around 34 percent of votes 
and sent 363 deputies to Parliament. A government founded by Abdullah Gül received a vote 
                                                             
164 Kılıçdaroğlu Kürtlere Özerklik vaat etti (Haberpolitik News, May 2011) 
165All the information is taken from Todayszaman News Webpage 
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of confidence on Nov. 28. Relevant constitutional amendments were carried out after the AK 
Party was swept to power in 2002, and Erdoğan was eligible to run in parliamentary 
elections held in March 2003. He was then elected prime minister and founded the 59th 
government. In 2007’s elections, AK Party had 47 percent of votes in parliamentary elections 
and sent 340 deputies to Parliament. The 60th government founded by Erdoğan received a 
vote of confidence on Sept. 5. In 2011, last elections in Turkey were resulted with the victory 
of the AK Party and they had 49.95 percent of votes and sent 326 deputies to Parliament. 
12.1. REACTIONS OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY 
AKP government paid more attention to the EU membership process in comparison to 
former governments and tried to take necessary steps decidedly.  Turkey’s EU integration 
process which has taken more than half age  resulted with starting full membership 
negotiations on October 3, 2005 and EU-Turkey relations has moved into another direction 
during the AKP government.  
12.2. GOVERNMENT’S PERSPECTIVE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
During AKP’s first years of government, AKP showed concrete indicators by taking positive 
steps regarding EU reforms. Reform reactions of ABGS after 2005 are the most concrete 
indicators of these steps. AKP assess the EU membership process as integration and also a 
reconstruction process which will increase the political, social and legal standards of 
country.166 In AKP’s 2007 election declaration, AKP referred to basic rights and freedoms at 
EU membership process and defended that “Political power and bureaucratic structures 
cannot interfere to be used of basic rights and freedoms in democratic regimes; basic rights 
and freedoms which are protected with the international agreements should be 
implemented correctly in daily life”.167 In addition, AKP stated that discussions about 
religious, gender, ethnic discrimination and sect are result of rights and freedom deficiencies 
and they aimed to promote an understanding of the state which based on human rights by 
moving the Turkey democracy to the universal level.168 
                                                             
166 AKP 2007 Election Declaration 163 
167Ibid. 10 
168 Ibid. 10 
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In this direction, one of the first actions of AK Party for the EU process was to establish the 
Reform Monitoring Group on 10 September, 2003. The aim of establishing such a group was 
to monitor the EU harmonizing reform implementations.  
12.3. REFORM MONITORING GROUP169 
After Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria, government decided to found the 
Reform Monitoring Group (hereafter will be RIG) in September 2003 to take new steps and 
continue political reforms during the EU full membership process. RIG is arranged with the 
contributions of Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chief negotiator government 
minister and coordinated by ABGS. General secretariat of RIG is performed by the ABGS. 
Main duty area of the RIG is to follow the implementations of political reforms during the EU 
process. Within this framework; RIG aims to follow and inducement the implementation of 
the detailed legislation reforms about fundamental rights and freedoms, democracy, rule of 
law and human rights issues. 
 As we all know, prior condition to start negotiations with European Union is Copenhagen 
Political Criteria which includes democracy, rule of law and human rights issues constitute 
the priority agenda of the RIG. In addition, RIG keep track the implementations of EU 
reforms and follows the progresses in this regard in its meetings. Main subjects of the 
meetings are the quick implementation of EU reforms and contributions of these reforms to 
the development of society and EU process. 
12.4. OTHER REFORM STUDIES OF GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF EU 
AFFAIRS 
According to ABGS, Turkey who implemented political reforms (which could not 
implemented since 40 years) in last 10 years with speed of EU negotiations have become 
more free, democratic, consistent, transparent and with the new reform packages 
constitution and legal changes applied Turkey to EU standards in many areas from freedom 
of speech, press and organization freedom to minority, women and children rights.170 It is for 
                                                             
169 All the information was taken from Department of Foreign Affairs and European Union, AB Uyum 
Çalışmaları – Reform İzleme Grubu Çalışmaları – Genel Bilgi 
170ABGS, AB Üyesi Bir Türkiye (Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Ankara) 4 
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sure ABGS implemented many reforms which has not done until today, but these reforms 
remained limited and also remained missing about religious freedom and minority rights. 
Thus, needed legal changes have not implemented in this respect and all the steps taken 
have been fling about these issues. Hesitant to act to implement religious freedom reform is 
a indicator that AKP moves according to its dynamics because of AKP have strong 
conservative base and not to draw attention of this group. Moreover, situation is not 
different about minority reforms which draw attention of majority of society. Like other 
political parties, AKP also evaluate the EU reforms according to its internal dynamics and 
respond arbitrary. Therefore, constant critics of EU Commission about religious freedom and 
minority rights have continued after negotiation process as well. In this direction, when we 
analyze the reform studies after 2005, we can clearly see that religious freedom and 
minority reforms are little if any. Furthermore, there is no directly related reform concerning 
minority and religious freedom in the “Political Reforms in Turkey” paper which was 
published by ABGS. As a matter of fact, parallel to the international developments, there is 
observable reducing in EU-Turkey relations and relationship has reached to the showdown 
dimension in some periods.  
In 2007, a senior officer of EU told that “EU-Turkey relations are not in the same level 
compared to last year. EU-Turkey relations disinclined”171 and in 2011, member of the EU 
Enlargement Stefan Füle stated that “…there are many question marks whether EU-Turkey 
relationship will be like a passionate tango or poker with full of bluffs...”172 Interruption of 
EU-Turkey relations affected the reform implementations in Turkey. With the disinclining of 
relations, government who are not willing to implement religious freedom and minority right 
reforms threw background out of focus more these reform implementations. However, 
there has been slightly improvement in religious freedom and minority issues in Turkey. 
As mentioned in the EU progress reports, there has been some progress about religious 
freedom in Turkey such as giving back to the Greek orphanage to Patriarch of Fener, perform 
a ritual of “Ecumenical” Patriarch Bartholomew at Sumela Monastery after nearly ninety 
years later on 15th of August, having meeting with non-Muslim groups leaders of Minister of 
                                                             
171“Türkiye-AB ilişkileri zayıfladı” tartışması (AB Haber News, February 2007) 
172 Füle: "AB'yi seçime kurban etmeyin" (CNNTurk News, May 2011)   
 56
State for EU Affairs, ABGS and related ministries, being arranged of first religious rite on the 
island  in Lake Van Akdemir Surp Armenian Church of Holy Cross since 1915.173  
Receiving an award of Egemen Bağış on religious freedom shows us that steps were taken 
are on the right way although further efforts are needed in the future. In his one speech, 
Egemen Bağış pointed out that problems faced in the past are being overcomed slowly by 
saying “Speaking about freedom of religion Turkey faced some difficult times whatever the 
reasons might be. In our secular constitutional system, religious and spiritual communities 
practice their beliefs on the basis of the equality of citizens and on the principle of the 
freedom of religion. Nevertheless, there had been times where some shortcomings occurred 
in the implementation of these laws. However, Turkey is changing with great pace and 
becoming a more liberal and open society.”174 As Mine Yıldırım175 stated about religious 
freedom, “Members of all religions as well as unbelievers encounter problems related to 
freedom of religion or belief in Turkey and a comprehensive strategy addressing all of these 
problems needs to be formulated with participation of all belief communities.”176 
There have been also some progresses about minority rights, cultural rights and protection 
of minorities. Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) removed all the obstacles in 
broadcasting in Kurdish and other languages for public and private TV channels. 14 radio 
station and TV channel were permitted to broadcast in Kurdish and Arabic, a Kurdish theater 
play was showed in Diyarbakır Municipality Theater. In June, Minister of State for EU Affairs 
invited all EU ambassadors to the Kurdish literature activity which was organized at 
Bahçesaray Village in Van and first Kurdish and Assyrian language departments were 
founded at University of Mardin Artuklu and master students were started to be accepted to 
these departments. 177In addition, Kurdish opening is also another step of government about 
minority issues. Even though opening has no clear result, there are future hopes that Kurdish 
people can name their children and villages in Kurdish, Kurdish broadcasts can be completely 
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free. As stated in the RIG’s 2010 February meeting, these implemented reforms, 
arrangements made, steps taken are done to meet the EU criteria.178 
As we see, reform implementations are not sufficient despite of we see some progress about 
them. When we both consider negative and positive developments, negative ones are more 
than positive ones and further efforts for Turkish government are needed about 
implementing EU reforms.  
One of the representatives of Protestants pointed out that EU reforms mostly focused on 
property problems, but all these pressures from EU are welcomed by Protestants. He also 
stated that although legal obstacles were removed, practical obstacles remains such as law 
enforcements’ beyond the intention audits to the Protestant Institutions and public attacks 
to the churches or protestants. About the evaluation of EU reforms from the public side, he 
said that due to being many nationalists in Turkey, these reform calls are seen negative and 
people think that EU will separate Turkey with the help of these Reforms. In addition, due to 
having these kinds of problems, Protestants have sincerity concern about the 
implementation of these reforms. He also think that these kind of problems must be solved 
with the internal Dynamics despite of EU’s pressure has positive sides. All in all, 
representatives of Protestants are not fully satisfied because of implementation problems 
and sincerity concerns. In the Legal and Social Problems of Protestants in Turkey 2010 
report, it is also stated that “Freedom of thought, religion and belief should be ensured in 
Turkey in a manner compatible with the standards of international law. To this end the rights 
articulated in the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 18, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 (to which Turkey is signatory) and the 1981 UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief (which Turkey accepted), should be promoted and treated as a priority 
among democratization objectives and The government should genuinely implement the 
principle of impartiality and the value of maintaining a stance that is equally distant from all 
philosophical thoughts, religions and beliefs.”179 
                                                             
178 Reform Monitoring Group Meeting 19 (February, 2010) 6 
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Yet, a representative from Hacı Bektas Veli Culture and Tourism Associations Headquarter 
stated that Alevis stayed out coverage area of state during Ottoman and lived independent 
but with modern state, Alevis forced to recognize the laws of state. He also pointed out that 
Alevis were murdered by the Sunni Muslims and state’s pressure tools and EU jut holded 
aloof by not using its sanction power like embargo. In addition, both EU and AKP are not 
candid to heal the situations of Alevis and studies of Alevis such as joint programmes among 
EU and Alevis were averted by the National Agency. Moreover, he also said that EU should 
force Turkey to replace mosques which were built by the tax of Alevis to Cem Houses and if 
EU makes Turkey pay compensation because of behaving cruelly against Alevis, then they 
would believe the sincerity of EU. Representative also added that they support the EU 
membership regarding change of existing laws. However, he acknowledged that problems 
must be solved with the internal dynamics of country rather than external dynamics.  
No doubly, Assyrians, Armenians, Jewish and other religious minorities have same kind of 
difficulties. Even though they had some rights through EU reforms, religious groups are not 
satisfied the current situation due to problems in practices and frigid attitude of state. 
 Ethnic minority groups also stated many times that they are not satisfied of government’s 
attitude and implementation process of EU reforms.  
Consequently, not being solved of problems stated in the EU progress reports are still 
thought provoking although there has been some progress about religious freedom and 
minorities. No one expect that these problems will be solved in a short period of time but 
when we look at the process, Turkey are not enthusiastic to make changes about religious 
freedom and minority issue. Of course, decisions of government do not enough to solve all 
these problems. Government needs to take support of citizens and other political actors. 
AKP must take the first step while they are the governing party since 2005. Unfortunately, 
AKP are not willing to take necessary steps and extend the reform implementation process. 
13. CONCLUSION 
We can see clearly that both citizens and political parties including government have doubts 
to implement religious freedom and minorities reforms called by EU. Even there have been 
some improvements about reforms, political parties do not care so much with EU reforms 
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when they do not have interests. BDP which can be defined as a Kurdish party support the 
implementation of minority rights reforms with their discourses. On the other hand, they 
indirectly mention that they support the religious freedom reform.  Nationalist party MHP 
strongly stand against the implementations of these two reforms while they think that EU 
tries to split the country by demanding minority rights and religious freedom reforms.  
Republican People’s Party also stands against implementation of these two reforms. They 
also think that EU tries to create minorities in Turkey which does not exist and CHP wants 
Lausanne Treaty unchanged. They also have vote concerns and they are trying to block the 
government’s reform efforts despite of being limited. As governing party AKP, they might 
seem to willing to implement EU reforms but in fact they have concerns to implement 
religious freedom and minority right reforms. AKP can be described as a Muslim party and 
they do not want to lose the votes of Muslim people by changing the situations of non-
Muslim religious groups. In addition to these, history itself also affects the actions of political 
parties in Turkey. Due to having conflict with non-Muslim and ethnic minorities in the past, 
political parties shape their policies according to these traces of the history.  When we look 
at the reactions of public, they have concerns about implementations of these reforms. Like 
political parties, they are also affected from historical events and they faced very dramatic 
events in the past, especially before and after World War I. Capitulations and Treaty of 
Sevres terribly damaged the perspective of political actors and Turkish citizens to the 
minorities and different religious groups. Therefore, their reactions to these reforms called 
by EU were not welcomed by the majority of the country.  
Within this context, EU reacted negatively to the implementations of religious freedom and 
minority rights reforms in Turkey. EU Commission, parliament members, some groups 
openly stated that Turkey needs to put further efforts to implement these reforms.  
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14. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ABGS   Ministry for EU Affairs180 
AKP   Justice and Development Party 
BDP   Peace and Democracy Party 
CHP   Republican People’s Party 
DIHAA  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
DTP  Democratic Society Party 
ECHR  European Court Of Human Rights 
ECRI  European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
ECSC  European Coal and Steel Community 
EEC  European Economic Community 
EU  European Union 
FP  Virtue Party 
HAK-PAR Rights and Freedoms Party 
HCNM  High Commissioner on National Minorities 
ICCPR   UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
ICESCR  UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
MHP   Nationalist Movement Party 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OECC  Organization for European Cooperation 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PKK   Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
R&D   Research and Development 
RIG   Reform Monitoring Group 
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SETA  Politics, Economy, and Society Researches Foundation 
TRT  The Turkish Public Television 
UN  United Nations 
USIRFC United States Independent Religious Freedom Committee  
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